Epic Enterprises LLC v. The Bard Group, LLC, 186 A.3d 587

Condominium at 10 Brown & Howard Wharf (13 units) created by declaration in 2014; defendant owns 9 units (70.8% voting share), plaintiffs own 4 units (29.2%).
Original declaration expressly prohibited commercial kitchens and on‑site food service (no restaurant use).
In December 2016 defendant unilaterally recorded a “second amendment” deleting that prohibition and expressly permitting restaurant use in certain units it owns.
Defendant applied for city victualing and liquor licenses for the proposed restaurant.
Plaintiffs sued in Superior Court seeking a declaration that the second amendment was invalid because § 34‑36.1‑2.17(d) requires unanimous owner consent to change uses restricted by a declaration.
Superior Court granted plaintiffs summary judgment; defendant appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an amendment that removes a prior prohibition on a use (restaurant) is a "change the uses to which any unit is restricted" under § 34‑36.1‑2.17(d)	The amendment changed a previously restricted use to permitted use, so unanimous consent of all unit owners was required	The amendment did not restrict or materially change use/occupancy rights and thus did not trigger the unanimous‑consent requirement; declaration also allowed uses permitted by local zoning	Held that deleting the prohibition constituted a change in the uses to which units are restricted; unanimous consent required and was not obtained, so the amendment is invalid

Pimentel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 174 A.3d 740 (R.I. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Newstone Dev., LLC v. East Pacific, LLC, 140 A.3d 100 (R.I. 2016) (summary judgment standard reaffirmed)
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dias, 151 A.3d 308 (R.I. 2017) (statutory‑interpretation issues appropriate for summary judgment)
State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68 (R.I. 2001) (legislative intent governs statutory construction)
Alessi v. Bowen Ct. Condominium, 44 A.3d 736 (R.I. 2012) (clear statutory language is given its plain meaning)
Waterman v. Caprio, 983 A.2d 841 (R.I. 2009) (principle that unambiguous statutes are applied literally)