Enyart v. Coleman, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1059

Background

In Aug. 2007 four young girls discovered a hidden video camera in Enyart's bathroom after using his pool; police went to his home, entered without a warrant, detained Enyart, then obtained a warrant and seized DVDs/VHS showing sexual acts with children.
Enyart moved to suppress (1) evidence from the warrantless entry/search and (2) statements from a post-warrant interrogation; the trial court denied those motions.
Enyart entered no-contest pleas but expressly reserved the right to appeal pretrial suppression rulings; he received an aggregate sentence of 365 years.
On direct appeal Enyart raised only voluntariness of plea; he later obtained limited reopening under Ohio App. R. 26(B) to challenge appellate counsel’s failure to raise Fourth Amendment suppression issues, and the state appellate court ultimately rejected his Fourth Amendment challenges on the merits and declined to reopen for Miranda claims.
Enyart filed a federal habeas petition raising Fourth Amendment suppression claims, Miranda/Fifth–Sixth Amendment statements claims, and ineffective-assistance/cumulative-error claims. The Magistrate recommended denial; the district court adopted the R&R, holding Fourth Amendment claims barred by Stone v. Powell and Miranda-related and several ineffective-assistance claims procedurally defaulted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Are Fourth Amendment suppression claims cognizable on federal habeas?	Enyart contends the warrantless entry/search and subsequent warrant were unlawful and trial court erred in denying suppression.	State argues Stone v. Powell bars federal habeas review because Enyart had a full and fair opportunity in state court.	Barred by Stone: Ohio courts provided an available avenue and actually considered the suppression claims, so habeas review is precluded.
2. Were Enyart’s statements subject to suppression under Miranda/Edwards?	Enyart says he had asserted right to counsel earlier and his later statements were elicited in violation of Miranda or were involuntary; thus they should be suppressed.	State says Enyart failed to raise these claims on direct appeal; appellate reopening did not preserve them and the trial court denied post-conviction petition on res judicata.	Procedurally defaulted: Enyart failed to fairly present Miranda claims in state appellate process; res judicata bars post-conviction attempt; no cause/prejudice shown to excuse default.
3. Can appellate counsel’s failure to raise Miranda or other issues excuse procedural default?	Enyart (through Rule 26(B)) argued appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting suppression/Miranda issues, which should excuse defaults.	State and court note App. R. 26(B) preserves only claims of appellate ineffectiveness, and an ineffective-appellate-counsel claim does not automatically preserve the underlying constitutional claim; the court also found no prejudice from failure to raise fourth-amendment issues on direct appeal.	Reopening granted only as to Fourth Amendment suppression of physical evidence; the appellate court rejected prejudice and did not grant reopening for Miranda claims; ineffective-appellate-counsel did not rescue the defaults.
4. Are ineffective-assistance and cumulative-error claims reviewable?	Enyart asserts counsel was ineffective for (a) allowing him to speak during interrogation and (b) not calling him at suppression hearing; cumulative error prejudiced him.	State contends these claims were not fairly presented in state court or are procedurally defaulted; any 26(B) filing did not preserve underlying trial-counsel claims.	Procedurally defaulted or unexhausted; court declines merits review. No certificate of appealability.

Key Cases Cited

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims barred if state provided full and fair opportunity to litigate them)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (statements during custodial interrogation inadmissible absent warnings and valid waiver)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (guilty plea generally waives nonjurisdictional challenges predating plea)
Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) (state rule permitting appellate review of specified pretrial claims preserves federal habeas review despite guilty plea)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (cause-and-prejudice standard for excusing procedural default)
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (state remedies must be exhausted through ordinary appellate procedures)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standard; state-court decision must be objectively unreasonable to warrant relief)
Good v. Berghuis, 729 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2013) (Stone opportunity means state courts must have permitted defendant to raise the claim, not inquiry into adequacy of procedures)