Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC
840 F.3d 1239
10th Cir.2016Background
- Stull owns patented surface estates that, at acquisition, were subject to reservations under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA) allowing government prospecting and use of so much of the surface as reasonably incident to mineral extraction.
- Entek sought to cross Stull’s surface to access mineral deposits located under other tracts within a unitized area; BLM-approved unitization/FRU agreement and Secretary actions enabled such access.
- District court initially held for Stull, barring Entek’s surface crossings; Entek appealed and this court in Entek I reversed and instructed the district court consistent with its interpretation of the SRHA and the Secretary’s authority under 30 U.S.C. § 226(m).
- After remand the district court entered judgment for Entek; Stull pursued a second appeal raising many of the same arguments previously litigated and some new constitutional ones.
- The panel majority applies the law-of-the-case doctrine to bar relitigation of issues decided explicitly or implicitly in Entek I, and finds the remaining constitutional challenges forfeited for failure to raise them in district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stull) | Defendant's Argument (Entek) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effect of 1946 MLA "savings clause" on pre-1946 SRHA reservations | Savings clause preserves Stull’s surface rights from being invaded | SRHA reservations already limited surface use to what is reasonably incident to mineral extraction and later laws may permit crossings | Law of the case: Entek I already held SRHA reservation allowed surface use reasonably incident to mining and later laws could permit crossings; Stull cannot relitigate |
| Secretary’s authority under 30 U.S.C. § 226(m) to alter surface access in unitized areas | Secretary lacks authority to change surface use rights for exploration | Secretary has authority to modify access as part of unitization/FRU administration | Law of the case: Entek I held § 226(m) furnishes the Secretary this authority; claim precluded |
| Chevron deference to BLM/IBLA interpretations (Int’l Petroleum) | Agency adjudication merits Chevron deference and supports Stull | The cited administrative decision does not address § 226(m) or this agreement | Law of the case: Entek I found the administrative decision inapplicable; no Chevron relief |
| Indispensable party (Rule 19) — dismissal for failure to join the United States | District court erred by not dismissing for nonjoinder of the United States | Case properly proceeded without dismissal; issue was litigated and waived | Law of the case and waiver: Stull litigated then withdrew cross-appeal on this point; issue precluded |
| Due process and equal protection challenge to statutory/regulatory scheme | Stull lacked fair notice of changes to its surface rights and faces unequal application of law | No adequate district-court presentation; issue raised late and lacks factual development | Forfeited/waived: Stull did not raise notice-based due process or equal protection in district court; court declines to reach on sparse record |
Key Cases Cited
- Entek GRB, LLC v. Stull Ranches, LLC, 763 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2014) (prior panel decision resolving effect of SRHA reservation and Secretary authority)
- McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031 (10th Cir. 2000) (explaining public confidence and judicial economy rationales for law of the case)
- Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 2010) (law of the case covers issues decided explicitly or by necessary implication)
- Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003) (unchallenged decisions at an earlier stage generally become law of the case)
- Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 262 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (discouraging reargument and explaining law-of-the-case policy)
- Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discretionarily entertained new argument in second appeal but did not excuse district-court presentation)
- Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912) (law of the case is a discretionary doctrine)