Enrique Martinez v. State
503 S.W.3d 728
Tex. App.2016Background
- Enrique Martinez was civilly committed in 2005 as a sexually violent predator under Tex. Health & Safety Code ch. 841 and subject to supervision requirements that included criminal penalties for violations.
- In 2012 Martinez was convicted at a bench trial of two counts for violating supervision requirements and sentenced to concurrent 25-year prison terms; he appealed.
- In 2015 the Legislature amended ch. 841 (S.B. 746), removing the penal provision that criminalized failure to follow civil-commitment supervision requirements and included a savings clause applying the amendments retroactively except where a "final conviction" existed on the effective date.
- This Court in Mitchell interpreted "final conviction" to mean convictions final after exhaustion of appellate review and held the amendments applied to convictions that were pending on appeal when the amendments took effect, reversing and dismissing the indictment in Mitchell.
- The Beaumont court in Vandyke agreed the amendments decriminalized the conduct but held retroactive application to convictions pending on appeal usurped the Governor’s clemency power in violation of separation of powers.
- In Martinez’s case both parties agreed the conduct was decriminalized and the amendments applied retroactively to his pending appeal; the sole dispute was whether that retroactive application violated the separation of powers clause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retroactive application of S.B. 746 to convictions pending on appeal violated separation of powers by usurping executive clemency | Martinez: apply Mitchell; legislative repeal decriminalizes conduct so conviction must be reversed | State: Mitchell applies; but retroactive repeal does not usurp clemency (or alternatively, separation of powers challenge fails) | Legislature did not usurp or unduly interfere with executive clemency; reversal and dismissal required under Mitchell |
| Whether legislative repeal functionally equates to a commutation of sentence | Martinez: repeal eliminates criminality, so sentence and conviction must be voided | State: repeal is legislative judgment about what is criminal, not an executive commutation | Not a commutation—commutation reduces punishment but leaves conviction intact; repeal voids conviction, a different effect |
| Whether legislative repeal functionally equates to a pardon | Martinez: retroactive repeal achieves same result as pardon (forgiveness) | State: pardon forgives penalty but leaves conviction on record; repeal voids conviction entirely | Not a pardon—the pardon preserves conviction; repeal eliminates the underlying offense and conviction, a distinct legislative power |
| Whether retroactive repeal unduly interferes with executive branch operations | Martinez: retroactivity impinges on Governor’s clemency power during appeals | State: executive clemency and legislative repeal are coextensive in time but distinct in nature and effect | No undue interference; branches may act coextensively without unconstitutional encroachment |
Key Cases Cited
- Mitchell v. State, 473 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015) (interpreting "final conviction" and applying S.B. 746 retroactively to cases pending on appeal)
- Vandyke v. State, 485 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016) (concluding retroactive repeal amounted to a pardon/usurpation of clemency power)
- Ex parte Giles, 502 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (holding retroactive resentencing provisions could function as an unlawful commutation)
- Ex parte Mangrum, 564 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (legislative repeal indicates conduct is no longer criminal and may bar prosecution)
- Williams v. State, 476 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (reversal where statute was repealed while conviction was pending on appeal)