Enrique Godoy v. Marion Spearman
834 F.3d 1078
9th Cir.2016Background
- During trial for second-degree murder, Juror 10 allegedly texted a "judge up north" and relayed that person's responses to the jury; alternate jurors N.L. and later E.M. provided declarations describing the texting as occurring "about the case" and relaying procedural guidance.
- Godoy's counsel moved for a new trial based on juror misconduct; counsel failed to timely disclose intended witnesses and initially attempted to present E.M. without prior notice; court continued once, received N.L.'s affidavit, and denied a further continuance and a new trial.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and denied Godoy's habeas petition (the court relied primarily on N.L.'s affidavit and treated communications as non-prejudicial procedural matters); California Supreme Court denied review.
- Godoy filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief and a COA was denied, but the Ninth Circuit granted a COA as to issues on appeal.
- The Ninth Circuit majority (O’Scannlain) analyzed whether the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under AEDPA regarding (1) presumption of prejudice from juror misconduct, (2) need for an evidentiary hearing, and (3) denial of a continuance; it assumed a presumption could apply (per Tarango) but concluded the state court reasonably found the presumption rebutted on the existing record and that no further hearing or continuance was required.
- Judge Fisher dissented, arguing the presumption of prejudice applied and the state court unreasonably (1) treated the defense affidavit as both establishing and rebutting the presumption, and (2) denied the evidentiary hearing under an incorrect and too-rigorous standard; he would remand for a hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Godoy) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juror's texting with a judge-like third party triggered a Remmer/Mattox presumption of prejudice | Texting about the case and relaying the judge's responses to the jury created a presumptively prejudicial extrinsic contact requiring the state to bear burden to show harmlessness | The communications concerned only procedural matters and the existing record showed no prejudice; presumption (if any) was rebutted without extra evidence | Court assumed presumption applied (per Tarango) but held state court reasonably concluded presumption rebutted on the record; no habeas relief |
| Whether the trial/state court was required to conduct an additional evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct | Remmer/Smith require an evidentiary hearing when possibly prejudicial extrinsic contact is alleged; denial violated due process | Trial court gave opportunities, considered affidavits, and properly exercised discretion to require admissible proffers and discovery before live testimony; no additional hearing necessary | Court held Supreme Court precedent permits flexibility and state court reasonably denied further hearing given proffers and counsel's failures; no relief |
| Whether denial of counsel's request for a further continuance violated due process | Counsel's trial conflict prevented adequate preparation; denial prejudiced Godoy | Trial court previously granted continuances; counsel provided no detailed reasons; denial was within broad discretion and defendant must show actual prejudice | Court held denial of continuance was within trial court discretion and state court reasonably affirmed; no relief |
| AEDPA standard application: whether state court unreasonably applied/contradicted clearly established federal law | State court's reliance on the same defense evidence to rebut presumption and refusal to order hearing unreasonably applied Remmer/Mattox/Smith | State court’s rulings fall within fairminded application of precedent; federal courts may not extend Supreme Court precedent under AEDPA | Court concluded state court decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law and affirmed denial of habeas relief; dissent would reverse/remand for hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (recognizes extrinsic communications "possibly prejudicial" and invalidates verdict absent harmlessness)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (establishes presumption of prejudice for private communications with jurors and requires a hearing to determine harmlessness)
- Remmer v. United States (Remmer II), 350 U.S. 377 (clarifies need for full hearing where presumption attaches)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (due process requires trial judge to determine effect of prejudicial occurrences; remedy includes hearing)
- Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (continuous intimate association between jurors and interested parties can trigger presumption of prejudice)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA standard for "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (deference standard to state court decisions under AEDPA)
- Tarango v. McDaniel, 815 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.) (held Mattox presumption applies to external contacts that tend to influence verdict; treated as binding here)
- Caliendo v. Warden of Cal. Men's Colony, 365 F.3d 691 (9th Cir.) (applies Mattox presumption where extrinsic communications create potential to influence verdict)
- Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (extrinsic influence or relationships that taint deliberations warrant evidentiary inquiry)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (standard for § 2254(d)(2) unreasonable factual determinations)