642 S.W.3d 502
Tex.2022Background
- Energen leased mineral rights and contracted drilling: Nabors/NPC for an oil well and Dubose to complete a water well; Dubose subcontracted with Elite Drillers and assigned Bryce J. Wallace to supervise the water well.
- The oil well experienced a gas kick January 14, 2014; circulation/returns were later reported lost. On January 17, Elite injected pressurized air into the water well, gas flowed from the wellbore, ignited, and exploded, severely injuring Wallace and damaging Elite’s equipment.
- Elite, Wallace, and insurers sued Energen for negligence, gross negligence, and trespass to chattels; Energen moved for traditional summary judgment arguing Chapter 95 applies and that it did not exercise or retain control over the contractors’ work.
- The trial court granted Energen’s motion (take-nothing judgment); the court of appeals reversed, holding Chapter 95 did not conclusively apply because contemporaneous negligent activity on the oil well might have caused the injuries.
- The Texas Supreme Court granted review, addressed whether a negligence claim can “arise from the condition or use” of the improvement on which the claimant was working even when negligence elsewhere contributed, and whether Energen met §95.003(1) (control) as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chapter 95 applies when plaintiffs worked on the water well but allege negligence at the oil well caused injuries | Wallace/Elite: their injuries were caused by negligent drilling at the oil well (a different improvement), so Chapter 95 does not apply | Energen: plaintiffs’ own pleadings and evidence show negligence as to a dangerous condition of the water well (the improvement they worked on), so Chapter 95 applies | Held: Chapter 95 applies because plaintiffs alleged negligence regarding a dangerous condition of the water well that caused their damages; negligence elsewhere does not preclude application so long as negligence involving the improvement on which the claimant worked was a cause of damages |
| Standard for “arises from the condition or use” — must it be the sole cause? | Wallace/Elite: contemporaneous negligent activity on the oil well may be the operative cause, raising fact issues | Energen: Chapter 95 covers claims where negligence regarding the improvement on which plaintiff worked was a cause of the damages, even if not the sole cause | Held: “Arises from” means caused by; the negligence involving the improvement need not be the only cause, only a cause of the damages |
| Whether Energen exercised or retained control over plaintiffs’ work under §95.003(1) | Wallace/Elite: Energen’s geologist recommended drilling depth and other involvement raises fact issues about control | Energen: Dubose subcontracted Elite; Wallace had no dealings with Energen; Energen made recommendations only — no contractual or actual control | Held: Energen conclusively proved it neither contractually nor actually controlled the means/methods of Elite’s work; plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue, so Energen cannot be liable under §95.003(1) |
Key Cases Cited
- Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992) (analyzing the “true nature” of claims when distinguishing negligent acts from premises conditions)
- Abutahoun v. Dow Chem. Co., 463 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. 2015) (Chapter 95 applies only when claim results from condition or use of same improvement on which claimant was working)
- Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Cuevas, 593 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 2019) (Chapter 95 applies if at least one negligent act involves contemporaneous use of the improvement; the negligence need not be the sole cause)
- Ineos USA, L.L.C. v. Elmgren, 505 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. 2016) (defining ‘‘same improvement’’ requirement for Chapter 95)
- Los Compadres Pescadores, L.L.C. v. Valdez, 622 S.W.3d 771 (Tex. 2021) (Chapter 95 does not cover the entire workplace; danger must arise from condition or use of the specific improvement)
- Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985) (owner generally not liable for independent contractor’s work absent supervisory control over the dangerous condition/activity)
- Clayton W. Williams, Inc. v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1997) (owner can be liable if it exercised supervisory control related to the condition or activity that caused injury)
- Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010) (premises-liability is a species of negligence; distinguishes factual and legal elements relevant to duty)