Endsley Electric, Inc. v. Altech, Inc., 378 S.W.3d 15

Altech contracted with IPS to build an intermediate school; IPS later operated as Endsley Electric and its entities merged in 2004.
Altech filed suit in Bowie County, Texas, asserting Endsley Electric and officers Karen and Brad Endsley bore liability for supplier payments totaling $59,333.83 and a $31,890.00 deduction from Altech’s pay for failed work.
A bench trial found Endsley Electric and Karen and Brad, individually, jointly and severally liable, awarding Altech $91,223.83 in damages, $7,961.00 in fees, and $6,210.72 prejudgment interest.
On appeal, Endsley Electric and officers challenged lack of individual liability, sufficiency of evidence, the $31,890 damages, and attorney’s fees segregation.
The court reversed in part, holding there was legally insufficient evidence of individual liability, insufficient evidence for the $31,890 damages, and improper non-segregation of attorney’s fees; judgment was remanded for fees segregation.
The opinion discusses alter ego/veil-piercing theories, corporate forfeiture issues, lack of capital, and whether Endsley’s charter abandonment affected personal liability.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Do pleadings support personal liability for corporate officers?	Altech argues pleadings support individual liability.	Endsley contends pleadings do not establish individual liability or theory.	Insufficient evidence supports individual liability even if pleadings adequacy assumed.
Is there legally and factually sufficient evidence of Karen/Brad as individuals breaching the contract or owing noncontractual duties?	Altech asserts individual breach or duty by officers.	Endsley argues no personal breach or noncontractual duty exists.	Evidence insufficient to support individual breach or personal duty; liability not established.
Is there legally sufficient evidence that Endsley Electric is liable for the $31,890.00 damage deduction?	Altech claims change order required relocation costs were Endsley’s responsibility.	Endsley contends the $31,890.00 arose from a school district change order and not Endsley’s fault.	Damages for $31,890.00 lack legally sufficient evidence; reverse and reduce verdict to $59,333.83.
Is attorney’s fees segregation required, and were they properly segregated here?	Altech seeks fees recoverable under contract claim; tort fees are unrecoverable.	Fees were not properly segregated between contract and negligence claims.	Segregation required; reverse and remand for proper segregation of attorney’s fees.

Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1990) (alter ego/veil-piercing factors and personal liability when corporate form used to benefit individual)
Tigrett v. Pointer, 580 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978) (alter ego when personal funds and control used to benefit corporate debtor)
Torregrossa v. Szelc, 603 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. 1980) (no evidence of undercapitalization; limited alter ego analysis)
Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986) (principles for piercing corporate veil; abuse require more than mere unity)
SSP Partners v. Gladstrong Invs. (USA) Corp., 275 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. 2008) (stringent standard for piercing corporate veil in contract actions; alter ego concepts)
Seidler v. Morgan, 277 S.W.3d 549 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009) (veil-piercing considerations; pleading requirements)