395 P.3d 78
Or. Ct. App.2017Background
- Tenant lived in a manufactured home in landlord’s mobile home park; tenant experienced untreated psychotic episodes.
- During an episode, tenant drafted and distributed a notice purporting to be from landlord that lowered rent, prorated prior months, and announced the tenant would manage the park; he delivered some notices but stopped once hallucinations subsided and did not retrieve the distributed notices.
- Landlord informed tenants the notice was false, served tenant with an expedited termination notice under ORS 90.396(1)(f) (authorizing termination after at least 24 hours for acts “outrageous in the extreme”), and sued for restitution; trial court granted restitution.
- The trial court found tenant intended to create and deliver the notice but concluded criminal mens rea was not proven.
- On appeal, the key question was whether the conduct qualified as “outrageous in the extreme” under ORS 90.396(1)(f), which the statute defines and illustrates by reference to other, more serious acts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether distributing a false notice is an "act that is outrageous in the extreme" under ORS 90.396(1)(f) | Landlord: false notice interfered with economic relations and was comparable to serious criminal falsification, warranting expedited termination | Tenant: conduct did not reach the statutory high bar; was not criminal, caused no substantial risk of injury or property damage | Reversed: conduct did not qualify; statute requires acts similar in degree to those causing substantial personal injury, substantial property damage, or specified serious crimes; false notice was not comparable |
| Whether a reasonable person in the community would find the act so offensive as to warrant termination within 24 hours | Landlord: community would view as sufficiently offensive and harmful to landlord’s interests | Tenant: reasonable community standard requires higher severity (risk of injury, substantial damage, or listed crimes) | Court applied objective reasonable-person-in-community test and found tenant’s act insufficient |
| Whether the act must be similar in degree to examples in ORS 90.396(1)(a)-(e) | Landlord: economic interference can be similar in degree to listed acts | Tenant: listed acts focus on physical risk, serious property damage, or certain crimes; economic interference without harm is not similar | Court: statutory text requires similarity in degree to acts risking substantial personal injury, substantial damage, or specified criminal conduct; economic interference here not similar |
| Whether the trial court’s finding about tenant’s wife’s tenancy termination should be addressed | Landlord: service on tenant also terminated wife’s tenancy | Tenant: contested adequacy of service | Court: did not address because it reversed on main statutory-interpretation ground |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (2009) (statutory interpretation: court’s paramount goal is legislative intent and primary weight given to text and context)
- State v. Shapiro, 270 Or. App. 701 (2015) (use of objective "reasonable person" standard in statutory tests)
- McDowell v. Employment Dept., 348 Or. 605 (2010) (examples of applying objective reasonable-person tests in administrative contexts)
- Padrick v. Lyons, 277 Or. App. 455 (2016) (use of reasonable-person standard to assess legal questions)
- Schmidt v. Mt. Angel Abbey, 347 Or. 389 (2009) (when statute includes a nonexclusive list, the list informs interpretation of the general term)