Emmett Lamon Roseman v. State of Tennessee, M2016-01051-CCA-R3-PC

Petitioner Emmett Lamon Roseman pleaded open guilty in 2013 to possession of marijuana with intent to sell, sale and delivery of crack cocaine (0.5g+), and three failure-to-appear counts; trial court later sentenced him to an effective 20 years.
At plea acceptance the court conducted a detailed colloquy explaining an "open" plea and asked Roseman twice whether anyone had promised him a specific sentence; Roseman responded no both times.
Roseman later filed a timely pro se post-conviction petition (counsel appointed and amended petition filed) alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary/unknowing plea.
Grounds alleged: trial counsel told Roseman he would likely receive a 15-year total sentence (a promise) and failed to show him audio/video discovery of the cocaine sale before pleading.
At the evidentiary hearing trial counsel testified he reviewed discovery (audio/video), usually reviewed recordings with clients at the jail via laptop, and denied promising a specific sentence; the post-conviction court credited counsel and discredited Roseman.
The post-conviction court found counsel effective, Roseman’s plea was voluntary/knowing, and that Roseman failed to prove deficient performance or prejudice; this appeal affirms that decision.

Issue	Petitioner (Roseman) Argument	State (Defendant) Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance — counsel promised a 15-year sentence	Counsel told Roseman he would get no more than 15 years, inducing plea	Counsel denied making any promise; trial court explained open plea and unpredictability of sentence	Denied — trial court credited counsel; no deficient performance shown
Ineffective assistance — failure to show audio/video discovery	Had counsel shown recording he might have rejected plea and gone to trial	Counsel reviewed recording, discussed contents with Roseman; no proof recording would change outcome	Denied — Roseman offered no evidence recording would have altered decision or outcome
Prejudice standard for guilty-plea context	But for counsel’s errors, Roseman would have insisted on trial	State: no reasonable probability of different choice/result shown	Denied — Roseman failed to show reasonable probability he would have gone to trial
Voluntariness/knowingness of plea	Plea involuntary due to counsel’s alleged promise and withheld discovery	Court’s thorough plea colloquy, Roseman’s sworn statements that no promises were made, and counsel’s competent assistance	Denied — plea was knowing and voluntary based on plea colloquy and record

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1974) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (applying Strickland prejudice prong to guilty-plea context)
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (plea must be intelligent and voluntary; court must canvass defendant)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977) (statements at plea colloquy carry strong presumption of truth in collateral proceedings)
Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. 1993) (factors for assessing voluntariness and knowing nature of plea)
Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1997) (standard for reviewing post-conviction factual findings)
Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1996) (performance component of Strickland explained)