Emilio Moreno v. Attorney General United States, 887 F.3d 160

Petitioner Emilio F. Moreno, an Argentine national paroled into the U.S., pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania (Aug 2015) to possession of child pornography under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d); sentenced to probation, computer forfeiture, and sex-offender registration. He does not challenge the conviction.
DHS initiated removal proceedings charging Moreno as removable for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
Moreno moved to terminate proceedings, arguing § 6312(d) does not categorically constitute a CIMT; IJ denied the motion and ordered removal.
The BIA (single-member, unpublished) affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that § 6312(d) is a CIMT; Moreno petitioned for review in the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit applied the categorical approach: identify the least culpable conduct that could be convicted under § 6312(d) and determine whether that conduct is morally turpitudinous; Moreno argued that consensual "sexting" between an 18-year-old and a 17-year-old was the least culpable conduct and not morally turpitudinous.
The court examined Pennsylvania case law and statutes, concluding Pennsylvania treats adult possession of sexually explicit images of minors as morally blameworthy; it denied Moreno’s petition and also rejected his vagueness challenge to the CIMT standard.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether conviction under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(d) is a CIMT	§ 6312(d) can criminalize consensual sexting between an 18‑year‑old and a 17‑year‑old, which is not morally turpitudinous	Pennsylvania law and legislative enactments show possession of sexually explicit images of minors is morally blameworthy	The least culpable conduct punishable under § 6312(d) (including adult possession of minors’ explicit images) is a CIMT; conviction renders Moreno removable
Whether the CIMT ground is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Moreno	The phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" is too vague to provide fair notice and invite arbitrary enforcement	Precedent and the long-standing meaning of CIMT provide adequate notice; possession of child pornography is plainly morally turpitudinous	The CIMT provision is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; Moreno’s due process challenge fails

Jean‑Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2009) (explains categorical approach and identifying least culpable conduct)
Partyka v. Attorney General, 417 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2005) (categorical approach to moral turpitude)
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004) (definition of moral turpitude for immigration purposes)
Mehboob v. Attorney General, 549 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008) (BIA deference on CIMT determinations)
Baptiste v. Attorney General, 841 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 2016) (de novo review of CIMT determination)
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (Supreme Court upholding CIMT standard against vagueness challenge)
Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (discusses sexting and prosecutorial threats in schools)
Totimeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (characterizes sexual assault/child abuse as morally turpitudinous)
United States v. Santacruz, 563 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding knowing possession of child pornography involves moral turpitude)
Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 814 A.2d 209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (adult convicted for possessing pornographic images of a 16‑year‑old; consent of minor irrelevant)