627 S.W.3d 197
Tex.2021Background
- Clarence Johnson, an experienced HVAC technician, installed a new Emerson compressor that used a Fusite 600-series electric terminal. Day after installation the terminal catastrophically vented scalding, pressurized refrigerant and oil, which ignited and severely burned Johnson.
- Terminal venting occurs when insulating glass holding terminal pins fails from overheating; Fusite’s 600-series has a pin-groove located inside the glass and was shown to vent under overloads. Fusite’s 700-series moved the groove outside the glass and performed much better at preventing venting.
- The 700-series was marketed alongside the 600-series, was available for essentially the same cost, and was developed specifically to reduce terminal venting risk.
- The jury found design and marketing defects, apportioned fault 75% Emerson, 15% Fusite, 10% Johnson, and awarded damages; the trial court entered judgment and the court of appeals affirmed.
- Emerson and Fusite challenged legal sufficiency of the design-defect evidence, expert testimony admissibility, causation (ignition source), and jury-charge error for omitting Grinnell factors; the Texas Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal sufficiency of design-defect finding | 600-series was unreasonably dangerous; safer feasible alternative existed (700-series) | 600-series was not unreasonably dangerous given product utility; evidence insufficient | Evidence legally sufficient: existence, cost, and performance of 700-series and other evidence supported finding of unreasonable danger |
| Expert admissibility / preservation | Dr. Don Russell reliably explained failure mode and causation | Russell should have been excluded for failing to consider product utility; objection not raised at trial | Exclusion argument not preserved; even reviewing sufficiency, other evidence supports verdict |
| Causation (ignition source and producing cause) | Venting released scalding fluid that ignited or alone would cause serious burns; ignition was foreseeable | No competent proof of ignition source; Johnson may have re-energized unit | Jury need not resolve precise ignition source; venting was proven and foreseeable harm sufficed to establish producing cause |
| Jury charge omission of Grinnell factors | Pattern Jury Charge and statutory standard (section 82.005) adequately instructed jury | Omitting explicit Grinnell-factor list was harmful charge error | Omission not reversible here; PJC language covered utility/risk and omitted Grinnell factors were subsumed in instructions |
| Single apportionment question covering alternative theories | No timely, specific objection to combined apportionment question | Combined apportionment may obscure differing bases for liability | Not preserved for review; court affirms on design-defect ground that provides complete relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Timpte Industries, Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2009) (elements of a design-defect claim)
- American Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997) (risk–utility factors for design-defect analysis)
- Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) (when expert causation is required for fire-origin issues)
- Gharda USA Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2015) (limits on speculative causation evidence)
- Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2012) (standards for reversal based on jury-charge error)
- Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1984) (older guidance on charge instructions discussed and treated as superseded)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 444 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. 2014) (review standard for no-evidence challenges)
- Boyce Iron Works, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 747 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1988) (affirmance on any valid ground when jury finds liability on alternative theories)