Emero Sanchez Tornero v. United States
161 A.3d 675
| D.C. | 2017Background
- Appellant Emero Sanchez Tornero was indicted for kidnappings and sexual assaults involving three victims (R.G., May 2005; N.R., Jan. 2006; C.A., Nov. 2008) and tried together; jury convicted on most counts related to C.A. and N.R. but not all charges.
- All incidents involved female passengers allegedly sexually assaulted in the back seat of taxis whose rear doors could not be opened from inside.
- DNA tied appellant to the assaults of N.R. and C.A.; physical and testimonial evidence corroborated the N.R. and C.A. incidents (including injuries and cell‑tower / DNA evidence for C.A.).
- R.G. never identified appellant and there was no physical evidence linking him to R.G.'s assault; the trial court admitted the other incidents to prove identity and denied appellant's motion to sever.
- On appeal the court held the trial court erred in denying severance because the offenses were not a sufficiently distinctive common signature; it reversed convictions related to R.G. (insufficient evidence) and to C.A. (lack of jurisdiction), and affirmed convictions related to N.R. (harmless error).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether joinder/severance was proper (mutual admissibility of other‑crimes evidence) | Gov: crimes were mutually admissible as a "signature" and to prove identity, intent, motive | Tornero: crimes not sufficiently similar; admission produced unfair propensity inference and prejudice | Trial court abused discretion; evidence not distinctive enough to show same perpetrator across all three; severance should have been granted |
| Sufficiency of evidence for R.G. convictions | Gov: composite sketch similarity and circumstantial parallels with other assaults support identity | Tornero: R.G. never identified him and no physical/DNA link; other incidents inadmissible for identity | Evidence insufficient; reverse kidnapping and sexual assault convictions for R.G. |
| Sufficiency / prejudice as to N.R. given misjoinder | Tornero: joinder prejudiced fabrication defense and warranted reversal | Gov: DNA and medical evidence strongly prove guilt; any joinder error harmless | Error in denying severance was harmless as to N.R.; convictions affirmed |
| Jurisdiction over C.A. charges (location of criminal act) | Gov: mens rea/intention formed in D.C.; cell records place C.A. entering cab in D.C. | Tornero: no proof appellant transported C.A. from D.C.; facts do not affirmatively show offense occurred in D.C. | Trial court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the kidnapping/sexual assault of C.A. in D.C.; convictions reversed and vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (establishes mutual‑admissibility doctrine for other‑crimes evidence)
- Brooks v. United States, 448 A.2d 253 (D.C. 1982) (identity by concurrence of unusual/distinctive facts standard)
- Coleman v. United States, 619 A.2d 40 (D.C. 1993) (upholding mutual admissibility where crimes showed distinctive signature)
- Easton v. United States, 533 A.2d 904 (D.C. 1987) (refusing mutual admissibility where similarities were commonplace)
- In re R.H.M., 630 A.2d 705 (D.C. 1993) (insufficient identification evidence warrants reversal)
- Smothers v. United States, 403 A.2d 306 (D.C. 1979) (kidnapping requires evidence of taking/detention against will; jurisdictional implications)
- Legette v. United States, 69 A.3d 373 (D.C. 2013) (government burden to prove other‑offense commission by clear and convincing evidence)
- Bailey v. United States, 10 A.3d 637 (D.C. 2010) (standards for reviewing severance/joinder rulings and abuse of discretion)