Elvis Elvis Ramirez-Tamayo v. State
2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 10905
Tex. App.2016Background
- Deputy stopped appellant for speeding (78 mph in a 75 mph zone); appellant opened the passenger door instead of lowering the window when the deputy approached.
- Deputy noted cigarette smoke, a full ashtray, a strong cologne odor, that the car was a rental with "no smoking" decals, appellant’s pronounced nervousness, and that appellant was returning to Miami from a casino.
- The deputy asked for consent to search; language difficulties made consent unclear, so the deputy summoned a drug dog that happened to be on scene; the dog alerted and a search revealed multiple pounds of marijuana hidden in the car doors.
- Appellant moved to suppress, arguing the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop after deciding to issue a warning; the trial court denied suppression, appellant pled guilty, and appealed only the suppression denial.
- The appellate court assumed the deputy’s testimony was true but found the State failed to develop the deputy’s "knowledge, training, and experience" sufficiently to show that the combination of innocent-seeming facts supplied reasonable suspicion to continue the detention and search. The court reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the deputy had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop and continue investigation after deciding to issue a warning | Appellant: the totality of the facts (nervousness, smoke/cologne, rental car, opening door, language barrier) are innocuous and, without a developed basis for the deputy’s claimed experience, do not supply reasonable suspicion to detain further | State: the deputy’s observations, combined with his "training, knowledge and experience" about drug-smuggling practices, justified continued detention and a canine sniff | The court held the State failed to substantiate the deputy’s professed expertise or the reliability of his inferences; the totality of circumstances did not establish reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop, so suppression denial was reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Contreras v. State, 309 S.W.3d 168 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2010) (noting ordinary conduct has been treated as indicia of trafficking in some contexts)
- Gonzalez-Galindo v. State, 306 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2010) (warning against overgeneralizing innocuous traits as criminal indicia)
- Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (reasonable suspicion defined by specific, articulable facts and rational inferences)
- Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (focus on degree of suspicion, not whether conduct is inherently innocent or criminal)
- Guerra v. State, 432 S.W.3d 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (reasonable-suspicion inquiry is fact-specific)
- Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (totality of circumstances must distinguish suspect from innocent people under same conditions)
- Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (mere officer opinion cannot substitute for specific articulable facts in reasonable-suspicion analysis)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (U.S. 2015) (a traffic stop cannot be prolonged beyond the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made absent reasonable suspicion)