2016 Ohio 1067
Ohio Ct. App.2016Background
- On Jan. 20, 2010 Akron school-bus driver David Sparkes rear-ended Police Officer Thomas Elton’s cruiser while driving a bus back to the garage; Elton was injured. No students were on board. Sparkes admitted fault and was acting within the scope of his employment.
- Plaintiffs (the Eltons) sued Sparkes, the Akron Board of Education (the Board), Akron Public Schools, and a John Doe, alleging negligence (count one), loss of consortium (count two), and negligent entrustment (count three).
- The Eltons voluntarily dismissed Sparkes and Akron Public Schools. They later conceded that negligent-entrustment (count three) lacked evidentiary support and the trial court granted summary judgment on that count.
- The Board moved for summary judgment asserting statutory immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. It conceded R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) might apply for the purposes of the first motion but later argued that either no §2744.02(B) exception applied or that immunity was restored by R.C. 2744.03(A)(5).
- The trial court denied the Board’s motion on the remaining negligence claim (count one), concluding R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) (negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee within the scope of employment) applied and R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) did not reinstate immunity.
- The Board appealed; the Ninth District affirmed, holding the Board was not immune from the negligence claim against it under R.C. Chapter 2744.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) immunity shields the Board from the negligence claim | Elton: Complaint alleges Sparkes acted in scope of employment, and R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) (negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee) applies, so Board is liable | Board: Count one alleges respondeat superior only; respondeat superior is not an explicit §2744.02(B) exception, so immunity remains | Held: Court finds complaint sufficiently alleges employee acted in scope; §2744.02(B)(1) applies and overcomes general immunity |
| Whether R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) restores the Board’s immunity (exercise-of-judgment/discretion defense) | Elton: Claim concerns negligent operation of a single bus by an employee, not discretionary system-level decisions; §2744.03(A)(5) inapplicable | Board: Operation of student-transportation (use of personnel/resources) is discretionary; §2744.03(A)(5) therefore restores immunity absent bad faith/wantonness | Held: Court rejects Board’s argument because the remaining claim concerns negligent operation of a single bus; Board did not show §2744.03(A)(5) applies to reinstate immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317 (1977) (summary-judgment standard)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (1996) (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden; nonmoving party must show specific facts creating genuine issue)
- Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 24 (1998) (three-tiered analysis for political-subdivision immunity under R.C. 2744)
- M.H. v. Cuyahoga Falls, 134 Ohio St.3d 65 (2012) (discussion of R.C. 2744 framework; abrogation on other grounds noted)
- Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7 (6th Dist. 1983) (standard for viewing evidence on summary judgment)
- Sickles v. Jackson Cty. Hwy. Dept., 196 Ohio App.3d 703 (2011) (application of R.C. 2744.02(B)(1) to respondeat-superior negligent-operation claims)