Elonis v. United States
135 S. Ct. 2001
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- Elonis posted violent, graphic statements on Facebook after his wife left him; some posts referenced real people and accurate details (wife, co-worker, workplace, home).
- He was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for transmitting threats in interstate commerce (targets: estranged wife, FBI agent, police, kindergarten class, park employees).
- At trial the jury was instructed to apply an objective “reasonable person” standard (whether a reasonable person would regard the communication as a threat); Elonis requested an instruction requiring proof of intent to threaten.
- The jury convicted Elonis on four counts; he was sentenced to imprisonment and appealed, arguing the court should have required proof of the defendant’s subjective awareness that his communications were threatening.
- The Third Circuit affirmed under its precedent that § 875(c) requires only that the defendant intentionally made the communication (not that he intended to threaten). The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Elonis) | Defendant's Argument (Govt.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 875(c) requires the defendant to be subjectively aware that his communication is a threat | § 875(c) requires proof that defendant intended the statement to be a threat (subjective intent) | Statute silent on subjective intent; liability may rest on objective standard (reasonable person) or at least knowledge of content/context | Reversed: statute requires a mens rea beyond negligence for the threatening-nature element; jury instruction relying only on reasonable-person (negligence) standard was erroneous |
| If statute silent, what mens rea is to be read in for the element that the communication "contain[s] a threat" | Intent to threaten (purpose) | No textual indication; Government argued knowledge of contents/context suffices (objective reasonable-person test applied by courts) | Court applies presumption favoring mens rea and holds the scienter requirement must apply to the threatening-character element (but declines to decide whether recklessness suffices) |
| Whether negligence (reasonable-person) standard suffices for § 875(c) | Negligence insufficient; conviction requires more culpability than mere negligence | Government framed its test as requiring comprehension of contents/context but effectively a negligence/objective standard | Court rejects negligence-only standard as inconsistent with criminal-law presumption requiring awareness of wrongdoing |
| Whether Court must decide whether recklessness suffices | Elonis: recklessness insufficient; requires purpose/knowledge | Government: recklessness sufficient | Court declines to decide whether recklessness suffices and remands for further proceedings consistent with the holding (i.e., that negligence is insufficient) |
Key Cases Cited
- Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (presumption that criminal statutes include a mens rea; "wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal")
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994) (requirement that defendant know facts that make conduct illegal when statute is silent)
- United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (infer mens rea necessary to separate wrongful from otherwise innocent conduct)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (knowledge of contents and character of mailed material suffices for obscenity prosecutions; court distinguished that knowledge of "character" turns on defendant's awareness of what was sent)
- Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29 (1896) (obscenity mailing case rejecting requirement that defendant know legal characterization of materials)
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (distinguishes true threats from political hyperbole; context matters)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats unprotected by First Amendment; statute at issue required intent to intimidate)