89 So. 3d 1076
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2012Background
- Ellsworth appeals a conviction and sentence for failure to redeliver hired property.
- She argued the lease lacked language required by 812.155(6) to permit prosecution.
- Statute 812.155(6) requires a specific notice to be initialed in the rental agreement as a prerequisite to prosecution.
- The signed agreement used older language: ‘prima facie evidence of intent to defraud,’ not the current permissive-inference language.
- The statute was amended in 2006 to replace ‘intent to defraud’ with the current framework; subsection (4)(b) creates a permissive inference, not a mandatory one.
- The trial court denied relief, holding substantial compliance; the court of appeal reverses and remands for discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether strict compliance with 812.155(6) is required. | Ellsworth: statute mandates strict compliance. | State: substantial compliance suffices. | Strict compliance required. |
| Whether Ellsworth's rental agreement satisfied 812.155(6). | Agreement did not contain the required language. | Agreement substantially complied. | Agreement failed to meet mandatory language; reversal warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Byars, 823 So.2d 740 (Fla. 2002) (statutes strict construction; legislative intent emphasized)
- Ferlita v. State, 380 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (strict compliance required; substantial compliance limited)
- Kinder v. State, 779 So.2d 512 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (shall generally mandatory; depends on context)
- State v. Rygwelski, 899 So.2d 498 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (section 812.155(4)(b) permissive inference)
- Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So.3d 228 (Fla. 2009) (statutory language controls; plain meaning governs)