Ellis v. United States, 806 F. Supp. 2d 538

Petitioner Adrian Ellis filed a timely but ultimately untimely 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition challenging his sentence.
Ellis pled guilty to accessory after the fact related to murders committed by Amarley Ellis and disposed of the victims’ bodies; the underlying crimes included theft of Social Security checks and bank fraud by Amarley.
Judge Raggi sentenced Ellis to the statutory maximum 15 years with a recommendation of immediate deportation after service.
Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief; the Second Circuit affirmed summary affirmance; Ellis completed his sentence and is in ICE custody with an order of removal issued in 2011.
Ellis alleges four ineffective-assistance claims arising from trial counsel: immigration consequences advice, allegedly misleading him about a federal crime, trial/PSR investigation issues, and post-sentencing abandonment.
The court analyzed timeliness under AEDPA § 2255 and, alternatively, addressed the Padilla retroactivity issue and the merits, ultimately denying the petition as untimely and without merit.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the § 2255 petition is timely.	Ellis contends timely under § 2255(f)(1).	Government argues untimeliness; final judgment in 1998, petition filed 2010.	Untimely under § 2255(f)(1).
Whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively for § 2255 purposes.	Padilla creates a retroactive right for immigration-consequences advice.	Padilla is not retroactive under Teague and watershed-rule exceptions.	Padilla does not apply retroactively here.
Whether Ellis's ineffective-assistance claims are timely and viable on the merits.	Trial counsel provided deficient representation on immigration consequences, crimes, PSR, and communication.	No deficient performance and no prejudice shown; many claims lack merit or are untimely.	Even assuming timeliness, claims fail on the merits.
Whether the alleged counsel failures regarding immigration consequences meet Strickland prejudice standard.	Counsel misled about deportation risk and aggravated felony status.	Advising uncertainty; Padilla scope limited; no prejudice shown.	No prejudice established; advice reasonable under then-applicable law.
Whether the sentencing-related claims establish ineffective assistance or other error.	Counsel failed to investigate PSR and allowed suppressed evidence; advised waiving a Fatico hearing.	No prejudice; PSR factual statements supported; suppressed statements were deleted from the final PSR.	Claims without merit.

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (U.S. 2010) ( Sixth Amendment requires immigration-consequences advice for noncitizens; not automatically retroactive.)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (framework for retroactivity of new rules on collateral review.)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (distinguishes substantive vs procedural rules for retroactivity.)
Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (U.S. 2004) (watershed-rule concept for retroactivity in Teague framework.)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (U.S. 1963) (establishes foundation for counsel's essential role in fair trial.)
In re Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA 1997) (BIA's interpretation relating to obstruction of justice for immigration purposes.)
In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) (BIA narrowing of obstruction-of-justice relation for immigration consequences.)
Doe v. Denis, 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011) (broader circuit approach to 'relating to obstruction of justice' under § 1101(a)(43)(S).)
Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) (modified categorical approach to obstruction of justice in immigration context.)
United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999) (articulates elements of accessory after the fact offense.)