Ellis v. the State
332 Ga. App. 883
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Raymond Charles Ellis Jr. was convicted by a jury of: possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, theft by receiving stolen property, obstruction of an officer, and driving on a suspended license.
- Facts: victim was robbed at gunpoint; Ellis drove the victim’s car (he had a suspended license), fled, dropped a loaded handgun (stipulated stolen) while running from police, was arrested and interviewed at the police station.
- Before the recorded custodial interview, the detective read Miranda warnings and Ellis asked, "So I can call him now? / Are you saying I can call him now?" The detective asked whether Ellis had an attorney but did not permit a call, and Ellis signed a waiver and agreed to talk.
- During the interview Ellis gave inconsistent accounts about how he obtained/possessed the gun and denied pointing it or taking money; those recorded statements were played for the jury.
- Ellis moved pretrial to exclude the custodial statements as the product of a clear invocation of the right to counsel; the trial court denied the motion and admitted the recording.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Ellis’s request to call his lawyer was a clear invocation and the subsequent statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel; the error was not harmless as the statements bore on essential elements of the theft-by-receiving charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ellis) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ellis’s question "Can I call him now?" constituted a clear invocation of the right to counsel | That asking to call his attorney, in context of Miranda admonition, was a clear invocation and police should have stopped questioning | The question was ambiguous; the detective’s clarification request showed lack of a clear invocation; later waiver cured any earlier ambiguity | Court held the question was a clear invocation; police violated Miranda by continuing without making counsel available |
| Whether Ellis’s later agreement to speak waived the earlier invocation | Ellis argued the initial invocation bars further interrogation until counsel is provided; later statements cannot retroactively undermine clarity of initial invocation | State argued Ellis reinitiated and validly waived rights by signing the form and agreeing to talk | Court held subsequent statements did not vitiate the prior clear invocation; police must cease questioning after invocation |
| Whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Ellis argued the statements were material and their admission prejudiced the jury on theft-by-receiving (knowledge of stolen nature) | State argued other evidence supported convictions and error was harmless | Court held error was not harmless; Ellis’s inconsistent explanations could have influenced the jury’s verdict, so reversal required; retrial on some counts permitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Manley v. State, 287 Ga. 338 (explaining requirement that invocation be clear so a reasonable officer would understand it as a request for counsel)
- Wheeler v. State, 289 Ga. 537 (noting de novo review where statements are recorded and facts undisputed)
- Robinson v. State, 286 Ga. 42 (stating that asking whether one can call an attorney can be a clear invocation)
- McDougal v. State, 277 Ga. 493 (holding request to call a third party to contact counsel can be a clear invocation)
- Allen v. State, 259 Ga. 63 (holding police must stop all questioning once right to counsel is invoked; later statements cannot undermine clarity of initial invocation)
- Wingate v. State, 296 Ga. 21 (explaining harmless-error standard for federal constitutional errors)
- Horne v. State, 281 Ga. 799 (placing burden on State to prove a constitutional error was harmless)