122 F. Supp. 3d 39
S.D.N.Y.2015Background
- Plaintiff applied for a U.S. passport on Feb. 16, 2014; application was denied for lack of supporting documentation (no certificate of citizenship).
- On Nov. 3, 2014 Plaintiff sued under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) seeking a declaration of U.S. nationality and an order compelling adjudication of his passport application.
- Parties agreed in January 2015 to hold the case in abeyance so Plaintiff could reapply and Defendants could adjudicate; the Court "so ordered" the stipulation but did not expressly retain jurisdiction to enforce it.
- Defendants adjudicated the refiled application and issued Plaintiff a passport on Mar. 31, 2015; the Court dismissed the case as moot on Apr. 23, 2015.
- Plaintiff moved for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d); the Court denied the motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Court jurisdiction under §1503(a) | Plaintiff argued the action under §1503(a) was proper because he was denied a passport and sought a declaratory judgment of nationality | Defendants argued no final administrative denial of nationality occurred and thus §1503(a) jurisdiction was lacking | Court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because denial was for missing documentation, not a final determination of nonnationality |
| Prevailing-party status for EAJA fees | Plaintiff contended he was a prevailing party because he obtained the relief sought (passport) | Defendants argued relief was voluntary and lacked judicial imprimatur; no judgment or enforceable consent decree | Court held Plaintiff was not a prevailing party under Buckhannon; relief resulted from voluntary action, not a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship |
| Effect of court "so ordering" the abeyance stipulation | Plaintiff implied the Court's endorsement amounted to judicial action supporting fees | Defendants noted the order simply recorded the parties' agreement and did not retain enforcement jurisdiction | Court found mere endorsement of the stipulation without retention of enforcement power does not provide sufficient judicial imprimatur to award EAJA fees |
| Applicability of EAJA where case dismissed as moot after voluntary relief | Plaintiff argued EAJA still applies because he obtained requested relief through litigation | Defendants argued EAJA requires prevailing-party status and jurisdiction, both absent here | Court denied EAJA fees because both jurisdiction and prevailing-party prerequisites were unmet |
Key Cases Cited
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (relief must be judicially sanctioned to make a party "prevailing")
- Ma v. Chertoff, 547 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2008) (Buckhannon standard applies to EAJA requests)
- Roberson v. Giuliani, 346 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 2003) ("judicial imprimatur" required for prevailing-party status)
- Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2004) (consent stipulation endorsement without retained enforcement does not create judicial imprimatur)
- Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff who obtained voluntary agency relief while case was in abeyance was not a prevailing party for EAJA)