Elliott Finch, Jr. v. Dexter Payne, 983 F.3d 973

Finch broke into his ex-girlfriend’s home at gunpoint, threatened to kill her and her children, coerced sex, stayed overnight, and was arrested and charged with multiple offenses; jury convicted him of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault (family/household member), and first-degree terroristic threatening.
Finch repeatedly sought to waive counsel and represent himself (statements at hearings and a handwritten pro se Faretta motion); the trial judge denied Faretta requests, citing mental-evaluation cooperation and the seriousness of charges.
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding Finch’s Faretta requests equivocal and suggesting the trial court could have concluded Finch engaged in conduct that would prevent a fair and orderly exposition of the issues; it also discussed competency/knowing-and-intelligent waiver matters.
Finch obtained federal habeas relief in district court on his Sixth Amendment self-representation claim; the district court concluded the Arkansas Supreme Court’s factual/legal application was unreasonable and ordered release or retrial.
The State appealed; the Eighth Circuit reviewed under AEDPA standards (28 U.S.C. § 2254) and affirmed the district court, holding the state-court determinations regarding invocation and obstructive conduct were objectively unreasonable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Finch unequivocally invoked his Faretta right	Finch: multiple clear oral statements plus written motion showed an unequivocal request to proceed pro se	State: statements equivocal, interspersed with requests for new/standby counsel and following a prior denial	Held: Finch’s invocation was clear and unequivocal; Arkansas Supreme Court’s contrary finding was objectively unreasonable
Whether Finch engaged in obstructionist conduct justifying denial of self-representation	Finch: record shows only mild disruptions and respectful behavior; no extreme obstruction to justify denial	State: trial court could reasonably find conduct that prevented fair and orderly exposition of issues	Held: record does not support serious obstructionist conduct; state-court finding was objectively unreasonable
Whether Arkansas Supreme Court’s comment on "knowingly and intelligently" waiver was a controlling basis and/or preserved on appeal	Finch/district: statement was dicta because competency had been assessed already	State: that statement reflected a substantive finding that Finch could not knowingly waive counsel	Held: State waived this argument by not raising it in district court; appellate court declined to consider it further

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (constitutional right to self-representation and requirement that waiver be knowingly and intelligently made)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA: unreasonable-application standard for federal habeas relief)
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020) (distinguishing mixed questions of law and fact in § 2254(d) review)
Bilauski v. Steele, 754 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 2014) (equivocation doctrine: conduct and speech both relevant to Faretta requests)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (role and appropriateness of standby counsel for pro se defendants)
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (distinguishing factual findings from mixed questions of law and fact)
United States v. Luscombe, 950 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2020) (example of extreme obstructionist conduct justifying limitation/revocation of self-representation)