Elliot Carlson v. United States, 837 F.3d 753

Background

In 1942 the Chicago Tribune published an article revealing that the U.S. Navy had broken Japanese codes; DOJ convened a grand jury to investigate but no indictments issued.
Elliot Carlson, a historian/journalist, sought unsealing of the long-sealed grand‑jury transcripts housed at NARA to support a book on the episode.
The district court concluded it had inherent supervisory authority to unseal grand‑jury materials outside Rule 6(e)(3)(E)’s enumerated categories and ordered release after applying Craig factors.
The government appealed, arguing Rule 6(e) provides an exclusive list of when disclosure is permitted and thus the court lacked authority to unseal for historical purposes.
The Seventh Circuit majority held Rule 6(e)(3)(E) is permissive, not exclusive, so district courts retain a limited inherent supervisory power to unseal grand‑jury materials in appropriate circumstances; it affirmed the district court.
A dissent argued Rule 6(e)’s secrecy language makes the exceptions exclusive and that judges lack inherent authority to create a historical‑interest exception.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Carlson has Article III standing to seek sealed grand‑jury transcripts	Carlson, as a member of the public, has a colorable common‑law right to access judicial records and thus an injury‑in‑fact	Gov’t did not meaningfully contest standing	Held: Carlson has standing; grand‑jury transcripts are court records and public access doctrine applies
Whether a district court retains inherent supervisory authority to unseal grand‑jury materials beyond Rule 6(e)(3)(E)	Rule 6(e) is permissive; Rule 6(e)(3)(E)’s list is not exclusive; Rule 57(b)/common law preserve limited inherent power to act where Rules are silent	Rule 6(e)’s secrecy clause (“unless these rules provide otherwise”) and structure make the enumerated exceptions exclusive; no residual power to create new exceptions	Held: District courts retain a limited inherent supervisory power to unseal grand‑jury materials outside Rule 6(e)(3)(E) when consistent with Rule 57(b) and precedent
Whether Rule 6(e) text/history forecloses judicial unsealing for historical purposes	Rule text, Committee Notes, and committee practice reflect courts’ historical discretion; enumerated exceptions are frequent examples, not an exhaustive list	Textual sequencing and Baggot reasoning show Rule 6(e) affirmatively limits disclosure to listed circumstances only	Held: Text and history support non‑exclusive reading; other circuits have recognized judicial inherent authority
Whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering disclosure here	Carlson satisfied the Craig special‑circumstances factors (historical value, absence of secrecy interest)	Gov’t conceded that if court had authority, disclosure here would be appropriate	Held: No abuse of discretion; district court performed thorough Craig‑style analysis and release was proper

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (grand jury is an institution that operates with judicial auspices but retains independence)
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960) (grand jury is "an arm of the court")
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959) (disclosure of grand‑jury materials is committed to trial court discretion)
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979) (courts have wide discretion in considering grand‑jury disclosure)
United States v. Baggot, 463 U.S. 476 (1983) (Rule 6(e) limits court‑ordered disclosure to specified purposes, e.g., judicial proceedings)
In re Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997) (district court has limited inherent power to disclose grand‑jury materials in exceptional circumstances, including historic importance)
Haldeman v. Sirica, 501 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (recognizing court authority to order disclosure under special circumstances)
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981) (grand‑jury materials are records of the district court)
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958) (judicial records presumption of access)
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978) (public has general right to inspect judicial records)
Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009) (documents filed in court are presumptively open; distinguishes unfiled discovery)
Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998) (denial of access to information can be an Article III injury)
United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1989) (public’s right to access judicial records supports standing to seek sealed materials)
Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) (judicial inherent powers persist but cannot contradict rules)
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996) (inherent authority cannot conflict with the Federal Rules)
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988) (limits on using inherent power to circumvent Rules)