Ella Ward v. Robert A. McDonald
412 U.S. App. D.C. 24
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Ella Ward, a BVA attorney advisor, developed chronic lymphedema requiring 1–3 hour daily treatments that are exacerbated by prolonged sitting; she requested a full-time work-from-home (flexiplace) accommodation in 2007.
- Ward submitted two brief physician letters describing treatment needs and that working from home would help, but both left open whether she could sustain full-time hours.
- BVA supervisors met with Ward multiple times, requested more detailed medical information about her ability to sit for long periods and to transport case files, and sent a June 5 memo enumerating specific information needed to process the flexiplace request.
- Ward resigned six days after the June 5 memo and later alleged the BVA denied her reasonable accommodation and constructively discharged her; BVA later (during litigation) sent an August 8 letter saying it would consider full-time telework.
- The district court granted summary judgment to the VA Secretary on both failure-to-accommodate and constructive-discharge claims; the D.C. Circuit majority affirmed, concluding Ward abandoned the interactive process and the BVA acted in good faith.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act | Ward argues BVA denied her reasonable accommodation (full-time telework) and obstructed process; she was a qualified individual who could perform essential functions with accommodation | BVA argues it engaged in a good-faith interactive process, requested necessary medical details to assess feasibility, and Ward abandoned the process by resigning | Affirmed for defendant: no reasonable jury could find denial because BVA sought needed information and Ward cut off the process |
| Interactive-process breakdown — who caused it? | Ward: supervisors’ June 5 demands were irrelevant, excessive, and not required for flexiplace; supervisors obstructed process | BVA: requested information was necessary to identify limitations and reasonable accommodations where need was not obvious | Held for defendant: employer acted in good faith; when need not obvious, employer may request documentation; Ward failed to supply it |
| Constructive discharge | Ward: refusal/delay in accommodation made working conditions intolerable, forcing resignation | BVA: no discriminatory intent; accommodation process ongoing and acted in good faith | Affirmed for defendant: constructive-discharge claim fails because failure-to-accommodate claim fails (no evidence of intentional discrimination) |
| Relevance of flexiplace policy and comparators | Ward: flexiplace criteria entitled her to telework like other employees; BVA applied atypical hurdles | BVA: flexiplace is discretionary and fact-specific; other telework approvals included adequate medical documentation | Held: existence of a telework policy and other approvals is relevant but does not show bad faith here; BVA permissibly sought individualized medical information |
Key Cases Cited
- Stewart v. St. Elizabeths Hosp., 589 F.3d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (interactive process and employer may request documentation when need not obvious)
- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2005) (interactive process requires good-faith give-and-take; courts isolate cause of breakdown)
- Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996) (employer not liable where it repeatedly sought needed information and employee failed to provide it)
- Templeton v. Neodata Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 617 (10th Cir. 1998) (employer cannot propose accommodation absent critical medical information withheld by employee)
- Jackson v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 2005) (employee withholding information can cause interactive-process breakdown)
- Mogenhan v. Napolitano, 613 F.3d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Rehabilitation Act incorporates ADA standards for qualified individuals and reasonable accommodations)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard; plaintiff must show essential element of claim)
