Elkins v. State
306 Ga. 351
Ga.2019Background
- In March 2013 De’Marquise Elkins (17 at the time) was indicted and later convicted of malice murder (killing a 13‑month‑old), multiple counts of aggravated assault, attempted armed robbery, and related offenses arising from shootings on March 11 and March 21, 2013; he received LWOP plus consecutive terms.
- Eyewitness and circumstantial evidence: victims and witnesses identified Elkins; he was seen in a red sweatshirt, had .22‑caliber bullets on his person when arrested, hid a gun which family later disposed of, and made statements to officers implying awareness of a recovered gun.
- Trial was moved to Cobb County due to pretrial publicity; Elkins was tried jointly with his mother; represented at trial by three attorneys.
- Posttrial, Elkins filed successive motions for new trial and an amendment seeking resentencing under Veal (addressing juvenile LWOP); appellate counsel later asserted ineffective assistance by post‑trial counsel for failing to develop Veal‑based mitigation evidence.
- The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed convictions and most rulings, rejected evidence‑exclusion and confrontation claims, found certain ineffective‑assistance claims waived, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on one preserved ineffective‑assistance claim regarding motion‑for‑new‑trial counsel and Veal resentencing preparation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Elkins) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court called overnight recess during cross‑examination of juvenile witness (confrontation) | Recess curtailed effective confrontation and cross‑examination of a key witness | Court exercised reasonable control to protect a young witness and manage time; limits allowed continued cross‑examination next day | No abuse of discretion; Confrontation Clause not violated |
| Exclusion of extrinsic evidence about the victim parents’ past abuse/addiction (defense theory of another perpetrator) | Evidence would raise suspicion that parents or associates had motive/opportunity to kill the baby | Proffered evidence only cast bare suspicion; did not directly connect parents to corpus delicti or raise reasonable inference of Elkins’ innocence | Exclusion proper; no violation of right to present a defense |
| Passing reference in cross‑exam about a “criminal juvenile report” (character evidence) and denial of mistrial | Reference placed juvenile record/character into evidence and prejudiced jury | Question was struck, statements of counsel not evidence, witness did not confirm existence of record; court promptly instructed jury to disregard | No mistrial; instruction and strike were sufficient; no reversible error |
| Ineffective assistance: (a) trial counsel allegedly slept; (b) motion‑for‑new‑trial counsel failed to develop Veal mitigation | (a) Lead trial counsel slept during trial; (b) Mason did not gather available evidence to show Elkins is not among the ‘worst‑of‑the‑worst’ juveniles per Veal | (a) Claim was not raised at earliest practicable time and is waived; (b) the preserved Veal‑related claim requires evidentiary development | (a) Waived for failure to raise at motion for new trial; (b) preserved and remanded for evidentiary hearing under Strickland framework |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- Veal v. State, 298 Ga. 691 (2016) (juvenile LWOP permissible only for the worst‑of‑the‑worst; requires on‑the‑record determination of irreparable corruption)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Moss v. State, 298 Ga. 613 (2016) (defendant may present third‑party perpetrator evidence only if it raises a reasonable inference directly connecting that person to the crime)
- Shaw v. State, 301 Ga. 14 (2017) (Confrontation Clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross‑examination; trial courts have wide latitude to limit scope)
- Jones v. State, 294 Ga. 501 (2014) (bare, generalized allegations of ineffective assistance in a motion for new trial do not preserve specific claims)
- Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546 (2017) (post‑trial counsel can preserve ineffective‑assistance claims that were not available earlier; preserved claims require hearing if not resolved on record)