95 N.E.3d 63
Ind.2018Background
- Plaintiff Elizabeth Roumbos (age 85) visited her husband in a hospital room, walked around the bed to get him water, and on returning to her seat tripped over wires/cords on the floor and fractured her femur.
- Roumbos retained attorneys (Vazanellis and Thiros & Stracci, PC) to sue the hospital for premises-liability negligence but the firm missed the statute-of-limitations deadline and did not file suit.
- Roumbos sued the firm for legal malpractice; the firm moved for summary judgment arguing Roumbos could not have prevailed against the hospital (so no proximate cause from the firm's missed deadline).
- The firm’s defense mirrored a premises-liability defense the hospital would have raised: the wires/telephone cord were a known or obvious danger, so the hospital would not be liable.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for the firm; the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed; the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and, after oral argument, addressed whether genuine issues of material fact remained about obviousness.
- The Supreme Court held the firm failed to negate causation because whether the wires/phone cord were objectively obvious to Roumbos is a factual question for a jury, so summary judgment was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff can satisfy the trial-within-a-trial causation requirement for legal malpractice | Roumbos would have prevailed against the hospital; the wires/cords were not known or obviously dangerous to her | Firm contends Roumbos could not have prevailed because the wires/cord were known or obvious hazards, so the hospital had no liability | Court: The firm failed to negate causation; whether the hazard was obvious is a jury question, so summary judgment for the firm was improper |
| Whether the condition was “known” to plaintiff | Roumbos: she did not see the wires until after she fell | Firm: earlier argument asserted she knew about the wires | Court: Roumbos testified she did not see the wires; condition not known as a matter of law |
| Whether the condition was “obvious” to a reasonable invitee | Roumbos: facts and room layout could have obscured wires; not necessarily obvious from her vantage point | Firm: presence of a phone and cords made the hazard obvious | Court: Obviousness is fact-intensive; reasonable jury could find wires were not obvious; not resolvable on summary judgment |
| Whether the firm met its summary-judgment burden to negate an element of plaintiff’s malpractice claim | Roumbos: firm must prove she would not have prevailed against the hospital; firm did not do so | Firm: argued it negated proximate cause by showing hospital would not be liable | Court: Firm did not establish as a matter of law that Roumbos could not prevail against the hospital; summary judgment reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Picadilly, Inc. v. Raikos, 582 N.E.2d 338 (Ind. 1991) (adopting the trial-within-a-trial doctrine for malpractice claims)
- Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007) (addressing limits of Picadilly; cited for abrogation on other grounds)
- Reiswerg v. Statom, 926 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. 2010) (elements required to prove legal malpractice)
- Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991) (adopting Restatement approach to invitee duty in premises-liability cases)
- Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 2004) (discussing Restatement §343A and the known-or-obvious danger rule)
- Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011) (example where obvious risk could be decided on summary judgment)
- S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 (Ind. 2014) (spectator-obvious-risk analysis and summary-judgment application)
- Flatow v. Ingalls, 932 N.E.2d 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (malpractice causation requiring a more favorable underlying outcome)
- Hill v. Bolinger, 881 N.E.2d 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (malpractice proximate-cause discussion)
- Smith v. Baxter, 796 N.E.2d 242 (Ind. 2003) (objective reasonable-person standard for landowner knowledge)