Elizabeth Harshaw v. Donald Harshaw, 26 F.4th 768

Elizabeth (Anne) and Donald Harshaw were divorced, reconciled without remarrying, then separated after ~16 years; Anne sued under equitable theories (express/implied contract, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit) for contributions during cohabitation.
The parties submitted the dispute to binding arbitration; the arbitrator awarded Anne $435,000 (calculated as half the increase in value of Donald’s retirement savings during their cohabitation) and included language referencing payment via assignment, QDRO, or other means, plus post‑judgment interest and a statement that the judgment should not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
The Lake County Superior Court entered judgment on the award; the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part, and the state judgment became final.
Donald filed for bankruptcy; he sought discharge of the award as a money judgment and claimed retirement‑account attachment/exemption; Anne sued in bankruptcy court seeking a declaration the award created a property interest (non‑dischargeable).
The bankruptcy court found the arbitrator intended a property award (non‑dischargeable); the district court reversed, holding the award was a money judgment; the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Harshaw)	Defendant's Argument (Donald)	Held
1) Nature of the award: money judgment vs. property interest	Award created an interest in specific property (portion of Donald’s retirement accounts); language about assignment/QDRO shows source/manner of transfer	Award is a money judgment: it names a specific sum, provides post‑judgment interest, and allows payment by cash or other means	Award is a money judgment, not a property interest; affirming district court
2) Whether arbitrator’s directions about QDRO/assignment convert the award into a property division	The mention of assignment/QDRO and order to execute such documents shows intent to transfer property in kind	The QDRO/assignment language lists options to satisfy the money judgment and does not mandate an in‑kind transfer; cash payment would suffice	The QDRO/assignment language is permissive/options for satisfaction and does not override money‑judgment language
3) Whether arbitrator’s statement that the judgment is non‑dischargeable controls dischargeability in bankruptcy	The arbitrator’s declaration should be given effect as reflecting intent that the award be non‑dischargeable	Arbitrator cannot unilaterally control federal bankruptcy discharge law; dischargeability is governed by federal statute	Arbitrator’s statement is not dispositive; bankruptcy law (and statute) controls dischargeability

Paxton v. Paxton, 709 N.E.2d 31 (Ind. App. 1999) (distinguishing money judgments from orders directing transfer of specific retirement assets in divorce decrees)
Brown v. Pitzer, 249 B.R. 303 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (divorce decree ordering in‑kind allocation from a pension treated as property transfer, not a money judgment)
Hilliard v. Jacobs, 916 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. App. 2009) (defining money judgment by certainty of stated amount and inapplicability of post‑judgment interest to property partitions)
Wright v. City of Gary, 963 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. App. 2012) (public‑policy exception to enforcement of arbitration awards must be explicit, well‑defined, and anchored in law)
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000) (Supreme Court requiring demanding standard for public‑policy refusal to enforce arbitration awards)
In re Krueger, 192 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 1999) (federal courts look to state law to characterize property interests and review such legal questions de novo)
National Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 976 N.E.2d 699 (Ind. 2012) (principles of issue preclusion/collateral estoppel under Indiana law)
School City of E. Chicago v. E. Chicago Fed. of Teachers, 422 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. App. 1981) (example of court refusing to enforce an arbitrator’s award on public‑policy grounds)