37 F.4th 527
9th Cir.2022Background:
- Cornel was released on parole in 2007 with a condition to keep the parole office informed of her whereabouts; her parole term nominally expired in March 2015.
- After an eviction in 2011 she sent the parole office a letter with updated contact details; the parole office was unable to reach her and issued a retake warrant and suspended parole.
- Cornel lived openly on Oahu from 2011–2018 (renewed her driver’s license, registered a business, executed leases) while having no contact with the parole office.
- The parole office periodically checked records; it located Cornel after she renewed her license and she was arrested in February 2018, ~7 years after the retake warrant.
- Cornel waived a pre-revocation hearing, the parole office rescinded the suspension, restored her March 2015 end date, and released her; she then sued under §1983 (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) and state tort law.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state and parole office are "persons" under §1983 (Eleventh Amendment) | Cornel sought damages from State and parole office | State entities are arms of the State and not §1983 "persons"; removal does not waive this defense | State and parole office are not §1983 "persons"; damages claim limited to officer in his personal capacity |
| Fourth Amendment: was the 2018 arrest unreasonable/stale? | Arrest was stale after 7 years and after listed maximum parole date; government interest de minimis | Parolees have reduced Fourth Amendment protections; officer reasonably believed Cornel violated parole based on inability to contact her and a valid retake warrant | Arrest was reasonable: retake warrant and inability to contact Cornel supplied an objective reasonable belief; staleness not shown |
| Due process: did the parole suspension without prior notice and the 7‑year delay violate the Fourteenth Amendment? | Suspension required pre-suspension notice; long delay violated due process | Morrissey-type post-suspension process is sufficient; delay was largely caused by Cornel and she suffered no prejudice | No pre-suspension notice due process violation; delay did not violate due process because Cornel largely caused it and no prejudice shown |
| State-law torts and immunity: false arrest/imprisonment, IIED, NIED, negligence | Arrest and delay support false arrest/imprisonment, IIED, negligence claims | State tort immunity bars vicarious liability for false arrest/imprisonment; officer has qualified privilege; plaintiff fails to prove malice, outrageous conduct, or damages for negligence claims | State immunity bars respondeat superior for false arrest/imprisonment; qualified privilege shields officer (no malice); IIED/NIED/gross negligence elements not met |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (state entities are not "persons" under §1983 for damages)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permits prospective injunctive relief against state officers)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two‑prong framework)
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (parolees have diminished Fourth Amendment protections)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process requirements for parole revocation proceedings)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy trial balancing test factors)
- Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (objective inquiry for Fourth Amendment reasonableness)
- Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2007) (probable cause not required to arrest a parolee)
- United States v. Rabb, 752 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1985) (officer may arrest on reasonable belief of parole violation)
- United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 1997) (staleness evaluated by facts and nature of activity)
- United States v. Hill, 719 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1983) (delay unreasonable where government knew whereabouts and made no effort)
- United States v. Santana, 526 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2008) (parole revocation timing requires showing of prejudice)
- Bennett v. Bogan, 66 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 1995) (parolee’s partial responsibility for delay negates due process violation)
- Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (state law violations do not automatically equal Fourth Amendment violations)