Eliu Cinto-Velasquez v. Loretta E. Lynch, 817 F.3d 602

Cinto-Velasquez, a Guatemalan national, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1993, sought asylum/withholding/CAT relief, returned to Guatemala in 2005, then illegally reentered the U.S. in 2007; removal proceedings resumed.
He testified to two 1992 encounters with anti-government guerrillas while serving in the Civil Patrol who tried to recruit him and to a 1997 incident where his wife was questioned; he fled the country after 1992 and left his family in Guatemala.
In 2006 Mara 18 gang members sent an extortion letter demanding 30,000 quetzals; he reported it to police, paid nothing, received no further threats, and later returned to the United States.
He claimed asylum based on past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution tied to (a) political opinion from his 1992 Civil Patrol service and (b) membership in the proposed social group “Guatemalan repatriates who lived/worked in the U.S. and are perceived to be wealthy.”
The IJ denied asylum, withholding, CAT, and voluntary departure; the BIA affirmed, finding (i) the 1992/1997 incidents and the 2006 extortion did not constitute past persecution, (ii) no evidence of nexus to a protected ground, (iii) the proposed social group is not cognizable, and (iv) relocation within Guatemala was reasonable; petitioner petitioned for review.

Issue	Cinto-Velasquez's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether petitioner suffered past persecution based on political opinion	The 1992 guerrilla recruitment attempts and 1997 questioning of his wife, plus 2006 extortion, together amount to past persecution	Incidents were harassment/intimidation or recruitment attempts, not persecution on account of political belief	Denied: substantial evidence supports that incidents were not past persecution
Whether petitioner has a well‑founded fear of future persecution tied to political opinion	Dated guerilla encounters and recent extortion give objective basis for future fear	Changed country conditions post‑1996 and lack of government inability/unwillingness to control gangs make fear unreasonable	Denied: record shows objective unreasonableness and changed conditions reduce risk
Whether the proposed social group is cognizable	Group of repatriates perceived as wealthy (and ex‑Civil Patrol cooperators) is a particular social group	Group is amorphous, lacks social distinction/particularity, and petitioner provided no evidence others were targeted	Denied: BIA reasonably concluded group is not cognizable
Whether denial of voluntary departure is reviewable and/or was an abuse of discretion	Petitioner argued IJ abused discretion in denying voluntary departure	Denial of voluntary departure is not judicially reviewable	Not reached on merits: court lacks jurisdiction to review voluntary departure denial

Melecio-Saquil v. Ashcroft, 337 F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 2003) (past civil‑war recruitment incidents do not necessarily establish persecution; changed conditions can undercut fear)
Tegegn v. Holder, 702 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 2013) (standard that harassment/unfulfilled threats are not necessarily persecution)
INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (applicant must show motivation on account of protected ground; refusal to join guerrillas not per se political opinion)
Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2005) (private‑actor intimidation may not rise to persecution absent government inability/unwillingness to control perpetrators)
Menjivar v. INS, 259 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2001) (changed country conditions can make future persecution unlikely)
Davila‑Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2008) (evidence required to show a discrete social group is at higher risk of targeted crime)
Hamzehi v. INS, 64 F.3d 1240 (8th Cir. 1995) (dated events may not support present objective fear)
Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2008) (BIA’s interpretation of "particular social group" afforded Chevron deference)
Fofanah v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 2006) (denial of voluntary departure is not judicially reviewable)
Grass v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2005) (court’s review is limited to the administrative record before the agency)