ELIAS v. CITY OF TULSA
2022 OK CIV APP 18
| Okla. Civ. App. | 2021Background
- Jeff Elias, a 26-year Tulsa police veteran, claimed cumulative binaural hearing loss with last exposure on November 30, 2017, and sought PPD and ongoing hearing-aid maintenance.
- Respondent admitted a compensable ear injury but asserted Elias was ineligible for monetary PPD under 85A O.S. § 46H (a 350-week cumulative cap).
- An ALJ found Elias had a 38% PPD to the ears (125.4 weeks) above a preexisting 13.8% disability but concluded the award was not payable because Elias had six prior PPD awards totaling 698.74 weeks, exceeding § 46H's 350-week cap; ALJ awarded continuing hearing-aid maintenance only.
- The Workers' Compensation Commission en banc affirmed the ALJ on April 7, 2021; Elias appealed raising statutory-interpretation and constitutional challenges.
- The court reviewed statutory interpretation and constitutional questions de novo and framed the dispute around the plain meaning of § 46H and its compatibility with due process and prohibitions on special laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 46H's 350-week cap apply to "all" PPD awards, including awards entered before the AWCA? | "All" should be limited; pre-AWCA awards should be excluded from the cap. | "All" is plain and unqualified; pre- and post-AWCA awards must be aggregated. | The statute is unambiguous; "all" includes pre-AWCA awards; Commission correctly aggregated Elias's prior awards and barred payment. |
| Does § 46H conflict with § 45C(6) (previous compensation does not preclude later compensation)? | § 45C(6) prevents prior awards from blocking later compensation. | The phrases serve different purposes; "shall not preclude" differs from "shall not exceed." | No conflict; both can coexist—prior awards don’t bar recovery but are subject to the cumulative cap. |
| Does § 46H violate the Oklahoma constitutional prohibition on special laws? | The cap singles out or unfairly treats particular persons. | § 46H is a general, even-handed legislative classification applicable to a class. | § 46H operates on a class and does not create an unconstitutional special law. |
| Does § 46H violate the state constitutional right to a remedy or substantive due process? | The cap denies a remedy and upsets the workers' compensation "grand bargain." | The remedy guarantee does not limit legislative authority; due process requires only a rational relation to a legitimate interest. | No violation: art. II § 6 does not impose a substantive legislative limit; § 46H is rationally related to legitimate interests (limiting employer exposure and setting damages parameters). |
Key Cases Cited
- Tate v. Browning-Ferris, 833 P.2d 1218 (Okla. 1992) (statutory construction: give legislative words their ordinary meaning).
- Greenwood Centre, Ltd. v. Nightingale, 465 P.3d 1269 (Okla. 2020) (courts must apply statutes as written when language is unambiguous).
- Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 12 P.3d 452 (Okla. 2000) (art. II § 6 remedy guarantee is a mandate to the judiciary, not a substantive limit on the Legislature).
- Hill v. American Medical Response, 423 P.3d 1119 (Okla. 2018) (substantive due process review requires rational relation to legitimate government interest).
- Evans & Associates Utility Servs. v. Espinosa, 264 P.3d 1190 (Okla. 2011) (statutory caps provide predictability to employers and set legislatively prescribed damages measures).
- Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 373 P.3d 1057 (Okla. 2016) (policy choices underlying workers' compensation "grand bargain" are legislative prerogatives).