Elfido Gonzalez Castillo v. Pamela Bondi, 24-3634

Elfido Gonzalez Castillo, a native of Mexico, entered the US illegally, became a lawful permanent resident in 1989, and later fraudulently obtained citizenship in 2009 by concealing a pending sexual abuse indictment.
Shortly after naturalization, Gonzalez was convicted of sexually abusing his minor niece, but remained a citizen for nearly a decade until his fraud was discovered.
In 2022, after his citizenship was revoked due to fraud, DHS initiated removal proceedings against Gonzalez under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), which generally allows for deportation of aliens convicted of child abuse after admission.
The Immigration Judge and BIA ordered Gonzalez’s removal under the child abuse provision, but Gonzalez challenged this, arguing that he was a citizen, not an alien, at the time of his conviction.
The case was transferred to the Sixth Circuit from the Third Circuit for review.

Issue	Gonzalez's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Does § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) permit removal when the conviction occurred while Gonzalez was a citizen (albeit fraudulently obtained)?	He was a citizen at the time of conviction, so the provision does not apply.	Fraudulent naturalization means he should be treated as never having been a citizen, so removal is proper.	The provision does not cover individuals who were citizens (even fraudulently) at the time of conviction; removal vacated.
Does revocation of citizenship under § 1451(a) relate back, making Gonzalez an "alien" at the time of the conviction?	Costello prohibits relation-back for removal purposes; he was not an alien when convicted.	Relation-back should apply, making him an alien at the time of conviction and thus deportable.	Supreme Court precedent (Costello) controls and forbids relation-back for deportation.
Should Congress’s broad intent to protect children override the text and Supreme Court precedent?	The statutory language and precedent must control.	The broad statutory purpose justifies interpretive flexibility to permit removal.	Text and precedent prevail over legislative purpose arguments.
Has subsequent case law or statutory amendment undone Costello's rule?	No relevant amendment or new precedent changes Costello; the rule stands.	Abrogation of related provisions and policy developments mean Costello should not apply.	Costello remains binding precedent; only the Supreme Court can reverse it.

Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120 (1964) (Supreme Court held that deportation provisions requiring an individual to be an "alien" at the time of conviction do not apply if the conviction occurred while the person was a citizen, even if the citizenship was fraudulently obtained)
United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521 (1950) (deportable under distinct legal wording; distinguished by Costello)
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964) (naturalized citizens enjoy the same rights as native-born if citizenship is lawfully obtained)
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (involuntary loss of validly obtained citizenship prohibited)
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (deportation statutes interpreted in favor of the alien when ambiguous)
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948) (rule of lenity applies in the deportation context)
INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966) (doubts in deportation statute interpretation resolved in the alien’s favor)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (reinforces longstanding principle of interpreting ambiguities in removal statutes for the alien)