Electronic Privacy Information Center v. United States Postal Service, Civil Action No. 2021-2156

Background

EPIC sued USPS (and its law enforcement component) claiming USPS operated an Internet Covert Operations Program (iCOP) that used social‑media monitoring and Clearview AI facial‑recognition without conducting or publishing a privacy impact assessment (PIA) required by the E‑Government Act §208.
EPIC submitted FOIA requests for the PIA, USPS found none and failed to respond fully, and EPIC filed suit alleging APA unlawful action, agency action unlawfully withheld, and seeking mandamus to compel a PIA and suspend iCOP.
EPIC asserted organizational standing and associational standing on behalf of two members, who declared they were active on social media and likely appear in Clearview’s database.
The key statutory text: §208 requires agencies to conduct a PIA and, “if practicable,” publish it before collecting identifiable information; publication is not an absolute mandate.
The court resolved the case on standing, applying D.C. Circuit precedent (including prior EPIC decisions) and dismissed for lack of Article III standing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Organizational informational standing under §208	EPIC says denial of statutorily required PIA is an informational injury to the organization	USPS says §208 protects individuals and Congress did not intend organizations to have this informational injury	Denied — prior D.C. Circuit precedent controls; EPIC lacks organizational informational standing
Associational informational standing for members	Members were denied access to required PIA information; that deprivation is a statutory informational injury	USPS says §208 only requires disclosure “if practicable” and FOIA does not mandate creation/disclosure of nonexistent records	Denied — informational‑injury test fails (statute not aimed at providing public disclosure and FOIA does not fill the gap)
Associational privacy injury from collection/use of Clearview	Members likely appear in Clearview; USPS’s use without a PIA creates a concrete privacy injury	USPS says no allegation of disclosure to third parties and mere internal collection/retention does not create concrete harm	Denied — alleged bare procedural violation; no concrete privacy harm or likelihood of disclosure alleged
Redressability of informational injury	EPIC sought an order requiring USPS to follow §208 and publish a PIA	USPS notes §208 conditions publication on practicability, so court order would not guarantee disclosure	Denied — even if informational injury existed, relief would not ensure publication and thus not redressable

Key Cases Cited

EPIC v. Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (§208 meant to protect individuals, not organizations)
EPIC v. Department of Commerce, 928 F.3d 95 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (lack of PIA disclosure is not the harm Congress sought; procedural violation insufficient without concrete privacy injury)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016) (procedural violations require concrete injury to confer standing)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing elements: concrete and particularized injury, traceability, redressability)
Friends of Animals v. Jewell, 828 F.3d 989 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (two‑part test for informational standing)
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (interplay of statutes can create informational injury when one statute’s reporting requirement triggers another’s disclosure mandate)
Owner‑Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. DOT, 879 F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (maintenance of information in government databases, absent dissemination, does not constitute concrete injury)
In re U.S. OPM Data Sec. Breach Litigation, 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (privacy injury based on disclosure or risk of disclosure to third parties)
Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021) (collection/disclosure claims analyzed in First Amendment association context)
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009) (procedural‑rights plaintiffs must show concrete interest that is harmed)