ELDREDGE v. TAYLOR
2014 OK 92
| Okla. | 2014Background
- Julie Eldredge and Karen Taylor entered a civil union (2005) and together planned conception using an anonymous sperm donor; Taylor is the biological mother of two children born in 2007 and 2008.
- After the births the parties signed written co-parenting agreements designating both as parents and both acted as parents: Eldredge provided day-to-day care, support, and was publicly held out as a parent.
- The parties separated in 2011, briefly reconciled, and dissolved their civil union in New Zealand in 2013; they continued to share parenting until January 2014.
- In January 2014 Taylor removed the children from Eldredge’s care, changed their surnames, and planned to move them out of Oklahoma.
- Eldredge sued in Canadian County seeking enforcement of the co-parenting agreements, a declaration of parentage, custody/visitation under the children’s best interests, return of surnames, child support, and a temporary order preventing removal from the state; the trial court granted Taylor’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
- The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding Eldredge has standing to seek a best-interest hearing based on the written co-parenting agreements and the parties’ longstanding parental relationship.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to seek best-interest hearing based on written co-parenting agreements | Eldredge: Agreements and the parties’ conduct created enforceable parental rights or at least standing to seek a best-interest hearing | Taylor: Eldredge is a legal stranger; absent proof of Taylor’s unfitness Eldredge lacks standing; agreements violate public policy | Held: Eldredge has standing under the Agreements; dismissal was error — court remanded for best-interest proceedings (Eldredge bears burden to show terms serve children’s best interests) |
| Whether co-parenting agreements are void as against public policy (e.g., marriage/adoption law) | Agreements are lawful contracts reflecting parents’ intent to share parental rights; enforceable | Agreements conflict with Oklahoma public policy favoring only one mother and one father or statutory parentage/adoption schemes | Held: Agreements do not violate public policy or statutory law cited by Taylor; court rejects reliance on unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage and finds Adoption Code does not bar such agreements; only scrutiny is whether terms are in children’s best interests |
| Applicability of Troxel (parental autonomy) to bar third-party relief absent unfitness | Eldredge: Special facts (written agreement, long-term parenting role, public holding out) create basis for state interference and best-interest review despite Troxel | Taylor: Troxel gives fit parents near-absolute autonomy; third parties cannot obtain visitation/custody absent parental unfitness | Held: Troxel does not make a fit parent’s decision irrebuttable; special factors here justify judicial review, but parent’s determination must be given special weight; court permits best-interest hearing with Eldredge bearing burden to prove terms benefit children |
| Whether other theories (in loco parentis, OUPA presumption, constitutional liberty interest) need resolution | Eldredge asserted alternative bases (in loco parentis, statutory presumption, constitutional liberty interest) | Taylor argued equitable parentage theories are not available against a fit parent and other claims fail | Held: Court finds it need only decide one theory for standing (contractual/co-parenting); other theories left undecided and not necessary to the decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (recognizes parents’ constitutional right to make child-rearing decisions and requires courts to give special weight to a fit parent’s determination)
- Huber v. Culp, 149 P. 216 (Okla. 1915) (party may have standing to seek enforcement of contract even when public policy concerns are argued)
- Matter of B.C., 749 P.2d 542 (Okla. 1988) (defines in loco parentis as assuming parental status and obligations without formal adoption)
- Fent v. Contingency Review Bd., 163 P.3d 512 (Okla. 2007) (standing requires a legally protected interest injured in fact, causal nexus, and redressability)
- Wilson v. State ex rel. State Election Bd., 270 P.3d 155 (Okla. 2012) (motion-to-dismiss-for-lack-of-standing reviewed de novo; allegations accepted as true)
- Horn v. Gibson, 103 P. 563 (Okla. 1909) (party seeking to void a contract bears burden to prove it violates public policy)