ELDER v. HAYES Et Al.
337 Ga. App. 826
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Collision chain on GA Hwy 10: Hardigree rear-ended Hayes (First Collision), which spun Hayes’s car into Elder’s SUV (Second Collision); infant Tobias later died; Watkins suffered serious injuries.
- Hayes had stopped (partially or fully) after hearing an ambulance; an ambulance was passing in the left lane; Elder had been merging and then moved into the inner lane behind the ambulance.
- SCRT (Georgia State Patrol) concluded Hardigree was following too closely and did not fault Hayes or Elder; Hardigree testified Elder did not obstruct him and he intended to go right when his brakes locked.
- Plaintiffs sued Hardigree and Elder asserting (1) Elder’s close trailing of the ambulance prevented Hardigree from moving left, causing the First Collision, and (2) Elder’s proximity made the Second Collision that injured/deceased occupants possible or contributing.
- Elder moved for summary judgment arguing lack of evidence that any alleged negligence by him proximately caused the Plaintiffs’ injuries; the trial court denied and certified interlocutory appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Elder’s position/proximity prevented Hardigree from moving left and thus proximately caused the First Collision | Elder was closely trailing the ambulance and blocked Hardigree from moving left, so Elder’s conduct caused the First Collision | No evidence Elder obstructed Hardigree; Hardigree testified Elder did not block left and he intended/go to the right because brakes locked | Court held no genuine dispute: undisputed testimony shows Elder did not obstruct Hardigree; summary judgment granted on this theory |
| Whether Elder’s conduct proximately caused Watkins’s and Tobias’s injuries in the Second Collision | Second Collision (Elder striking Hayes after Hardigree’s impact) created the force that caused or contributed to their injuries; expert shows differing occupant motions in each collision so jury could infer causation | No direct evidence which collision caused injuries; expert could not attribute injuries to a specific impact; circumstantial evidence leaves only conjecture | Court held circumstantial evidence insufficient to show it was more likely the Second Collision caused injuries; summary judgment granted on their claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 (uncontradicted testimony cannot be simply disbelieved on summary judgment)
- Berry v. Hamilton, 246 Ga. App. 608 (circumstantial proof must make inconsistent conclusions less probable; mere conjecture insufficient)
- Redmon v. Daniel, 335 Ga. App. 159 (sufficient evidence required to create jury question on causation)
- Grinold v. Farist, 284 Ga. App. 120 (plaintiff must show conduct was cause in fact; mere possibility is insufficient)
- Jobling v. Shelton, 334 Ga. App. 483 (summary judgment cannot be avoided by speculation; need admissible contradictory evidence)