Eileen W. Legue v. City of Racine
849 N.W.2d 837
Wis.2014Background
- Officer Amy Matsen, responding to an emergency call with lights and siren, entered an intersection against a red light at about 27 mph and collided with Eileen Legue, who had a green light and did not see or hear the squad car due to an obstructing KFC.
- Both parties and the jury were injured; jury found both 50% causally negligent and awarded damages to Legue.
- Officer and City moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed verdict based on governmental immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4); circuit court granted dismissal on immunity grounds and directed verdict on causation.
- The Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed the interplay between § 893.80(4) (immunity for discretionary acts) and Wis. Stat. § 346.03(5) (duty of emergency vehicle operators to drive with "due regard").
- Central legal question: whether breach of § 346.03(5)’s "due regard" duty is a ministerial (non-immune) duty or part of a discretionary decision (immune) such that § 893.80(4) bars suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 893.80(4) bars claims for breach of § 346.03(5) "due regard" duty | Legue: § 346.03(5) creates a ministerial duty; breach is actionable and not immune | Matsen/City: officer's lookout/speed were part of discretionary decision to enter the intersection and thus immune | Court: Breach of § 346.03(5) is not shielded by § 893.80(4); immunity does not apply |
| Whether compliance with § 346.03(2)(b) (slow down) and (3) (lights & siren) satisfies "due regard" | Legue: those requirements do not replace the separate duty of due regard; compliance doesn't automatically preclude liability | Matsen: slowing and activating lights/siren met the due-regard standard, so no liability | Court: Compliance with (2)(b) and (3) does not render (5) surplusage; due regard remains an independent negligence standard |
| How to distinguish discretionary decisions from negligent vehicle operation after Cavanaugh | Legue: physical operation (lookout, speed control) is distinct and ministerial, so liable | Matsen: operational choices were inherent in the discretionary decision to proceed, thus immune under Cavanaugh | Court: Cavanaugh’s pursuit vs. physical-operation distinction remains instructive; operation with due regard can be ministerial and non-immune; immunity cannot swallow § 346.03(5) |
| Sufficiency of evidence that officer's negligence caused the collision | Legue: pre-entry lookout, speed and control evidence support causal negligence | Matsen: any alleged breach after entry could not have caused the crash; entitlement to immunity also asserted | Court: Viewing credible evidence favorably to Legue, there was sufficient evidence of causal negligence; directed verdict was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 290 (1996) (distinguishes discretionary decision to pursue from negligent physical operation but holds breach of § 346.03(5) can support negligence suit)
- Brown v. Acuity, 348 Wis. 2d 603 (2013) (failure to perform nondiscretionary statutory duties—e.g., siren use—can be ministerial and subject actor to liability)
- Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26 (1962) (announced rule that liability is the rule and immunity the exception; immunity for legislative/judicial/quasi- functions)
- Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282 (1976) (defines discretionary versus ministerial acts; ministerial duties are "absolute, certain and imperative")
- Montalto v. Fond du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552 (1956) (historical precedent that emergency-vehicle exemptions do not absolve duty to exercise due care)
- Robbins v. City of Wichita, 172 P.3d 1187 (Kan. 2007) (overruled earlier Kansas precedent; held decision to pursue is not separable from method—liability possible for pursuit decisions)
- Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975) (driving an automobile is archetypal nondiscretionary act despite requiring judgment)