Eighner v. Tiernan, 184 N.E.3d 194

In Nov. 2014 Eighner sued Tiernan (case No. 14-L-11428). He paid filing fee and summons issued.
In May 2017 the circuit court granted plaintiff a voluntary dismissal "without prejudice and with leave to reinstate within one year."
On Apr. 23, 2018 (within one year) plaintiff electronically filed a "Notice of Refiling/Being Reinstated" under the original case number and uploaded the original complaint; no new filing fee was assessed and no summons issued.
Clerk accepted the filing but the case did not move forward; plaintiff later filed an identical new complaint under a new case number (Oct. 15, 2018), paid a fee, and served defendant.
Defendant moved to dismiss the new case as untimely, contending section 13-217 permits a plaintiff to "commence a new action" (a new lawsuit) within one year after voluntary dismissal and that the Oct. 15 filing occurred after that one-year window.
The appellate court certified/answered whether refiling under the old number satisfies 735 ILCS 5/13-217; it answered "no" and ordered dismissal of the new case; the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that holding but, exercising supervisory authority, treated the Apr. 23 filing as a motion to reinstate and directed the trial court to reinstate case No. 14-L-11428 nunc pro tunc to Apr. 23, 2018.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the phrase "may commence a new action" in 735 ILCS 5/13-217 allows refiling under the original case number (no new fee/summons)	Eighner: his Apr. 23 filing under the old number complied with the dismissal order and should qualify; section 13-217 should not be read to bar reinstatement.	Tiernan: "new action" requires a new lawsuit with a new case number, filing fee, and summons; Apr. 23 filing was not a new action, so Oct. 15 refiling is untimely.	Held: "new action" means a new lawsuit (new case number, fee, summons); appellate court correctly answered "no."
Whether the Apr. 23, 2018 filing should be treated as a valid reinstatement despite not being captioned as a 2-1203 motion	Eighner: dismissal order granted "leave to reinstate" within one year; his notice complied with that leave and the clerk accepted it.	Tiernan: Apr. 23 filing was not a postjudgment 2-1203 motion and section 13-217 does not alter 2-1203 jurisdictional rules.	Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed the statutory meaning of "new action" requires a new filing, it exercised supervisory authority to treat Apr. 23 filing as a motion to vacate and reinstate 14-L-11428 nunc pro tunc to Apr. 23, 2018 to avoid penalizing plaintiff given the unusual dismissal order and clerk acceptance.

Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (Ill. 1997) (noting prior amendment to §13-217 was declared unconstitutional)
S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander, 181 Ill. 2d 489 (Ill. 1998) (describing §13-217 as a savings statute)
Weisguth v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 272 Ill. 541 (Ill. 1916) (common-law rule that non-suit generally requires starting anew)
Hawes v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 212 Ill. 2d 93 (Ill. 2004) (voluntary dismissal is a final judgment for purposes of postjudgment relief under §2-1203(a))
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 496 (Ill. 1997) (original and refiled actions are distinct)
Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518 (Ill. 2016) (refiled action under §13-217 is an entirely new and separate action)
Rehabilitation Consultants for Industry, Inc. v. Nowak, 259 Ill. App. 3d 725 (Ill. App. 1994) (trial court loses jurisdiction 30 days after final judgment absent timely postjudgment motion)