Edwards v. First American Corp.
289 F.R.D. 296
C.D. Cal.2012Background
- Plaintiff Edwards seeks class certification and Defendants move to decertify the Tower City class and to compel arbitration.
- Tower City Title Agency, LLC referred Edwards to First American Title Insurance Co. (FATIC) for title insurance; RESPA allegedly violated due to referrals for value exchanges.
- Ninth Circuit previously certified Tower City class based on exclusive referral agreement; district court later stayed proceedings during certiorari proceedings, which were dismissed as improvidently granted.
- Defendants argue the Tower City class is abandoned, not ascertainable, and involves individualized issues; they also challenge the exclusivity, arbitration, and standing.
- Court applies FRCP 23 standards (numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy; predominance and superiority) and law-of-the-case limits on revisiting issues absent new controlling authority or new evidence.
- Court denies both the Motion to Decertify the Tower City Class and the Motion to Compel Arbitration, allowing ongoing class proceedings to continue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Edwards abandon the Tower City class by seeking nationwide certification? | Edwards did not abandon; tower-class findings remain valid. | Nationwide certification signals abandonment of Tower City class and its scope is constrained. | No abandonment; Tower City class remains viable. |
| Are Edwards and counsel adequate under FRCP 23(a)(4)? | Edwards has current understanding and willingness; counsel is capable and not conflicted. | Edwards’s bankruptcy testimony and potential conflicts show inadequacy. | Edwards and counsel are adequate. |
| Is the Tower City class ascertainable given RESPA and loan data issues? | Class definable via RESPA framework; databases (e.g., CoreLogic) yield needed data. | Need to determine federally related status and loan purpose on a per-loan basis; unmanageable. | Class is ascertainable; manageable with available databases. |
| Does the exclusive referral agreement provide common proof for the class? | Exclusive agreement provides common proof of the ‘action’ element for referrals. | New evidence shows diversification; undermines common proof. | Exclusive agreement provides common proof; does not defeat certification. |
| Has Defendants waived the right to arbitrate and must arbitration be compelled? | Waiver occurred; litigation continued for years; arbitration should be compelled now. | No waiver; arbitration rights could have been raised earlier; TFT-LCD-like logic not persuasive. | Defendants waived the right to arbitrate; arbitration not compelled. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) (adequacy of representation considerations in class actions)
- Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485 (9th Cir. 1994) (adequacy of representation factors)
- Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (rigorous analysis required for Rule 23(a) prerequisites)
- Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (rigorous analysis and predominance with common issues)
- Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995) (law-of-the-case and intervening changes in controlling authority)
- Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (arbitration waiver considerations and remedies in contract disputes)