EDWARDS v. CITY OF SALLISAW
2014 OK 86
| Okla. | 2014Background
- Sallisaw is a home-rule city whose charter vests power in an elective board of commissioners and states the police chief "shall have such other powers, duties and functions as may be prescribed by ordinance."
- Shaloa Edwards was the elected police chief (elected 2005, re-elected 2008 & 2011) and, by city ordinance, had supervised and controlled the police department prior to 2013.
- On Feb. 11, 2013 the Board passed Ordinance 2013-01 revising §54-31 to allow the City Manager to assume supervision/management of the Police Department if the Board deemed it in the city’s best interest; the Board also authorized the Manager to assume that role for 90 days.
- After the ordinance, Edwards retained the title, salary, office, uniform, arrest authority, and ability to enforce laws, but day-to-day supervision was exercised by the City Manager via an appointed captain.
- Edwards sued for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming the ordinance unlawfully removed his supervisory/management authority (an inherent duty of an elected chief) and violated due process by effecting removal without statutory/local removal procedures.
- The district court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance; the Supreme Court of Oklahoma vacated that order and remanded, upholding the Board’s authority to set police chief duties by ordinance and rejecting the due-process and inherent-power claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the charter permits the Board to limit or remove the police chief’s supervisory/management authority by ordinance | Edwards: elected chief has inherent authority to supervise/manage the department that cannot be removed by ordinance | Board: charter expressly delegates to Board the power to prescribe police chief powers/duties by ordinance; thus Board may define or limit duties | Held: Board may set duties by ordinance; charter language is plain and allows limiting supervisory authority |
| Whether the chief’s supervisory/management duties are implied/incidental to the charter grant to enforce laws | Edwards: managerial supervision is inherent/implicit in the office of police chief | Board: charter only expressly grants enforcement of laws; other duties must come from ordinance or statute | Held: No inherent supervisory power inferred; additional duties must be created by ordinance or statute |
| Whether Ordinance 2013-01 effectuated an unlawful removal requiring charter/statutory removal procedures | Edwards: stripping supervisory duties effectively removed him without required recall/for-cause process | Board: Edwards retained office, title, salary and other emoluments; no removal occurred | Held: Not a removal; procedural removal processes not implicated; ordinance did not violate due process |
| Whether Edwards had a property right in supervisory duties implicating procedural due process | Edwards: loss of supervisory role deprived him of a property interest without hearing | Board: no property right in specific job duties; chief retained position and emoluments; he received notice and opportunity to be heard | Held: No protected property interest in particular duties; due process claim fails; public meeting and opportunity to speak were adequate |
Key Cases Cited
- Nottingham v. City of Yukon, 766 P.2d 973 (Okla. 1988) (no inherent powers in a municipal official where charter is silent)
- Moore v. Oklahoma City, 254 P. 47 (Okla. 1927) (city charter may prescribe local officer duties; cooperation with state law enforcement does not preclude charter allocation)
- State ex rel. Burns v. Linn, 153 P. 826 (Okla. 1915) (enforcement of state laws is a sovereign interest that a city cannot abrogate by charter)
- Latting v. Cordell, 172 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1946) (charter construed like a constitution; plain language controls)
- City of Muskogee v. Senter, 96 P.2d 534 (Okla. 1939) (court will not read inherent/dictatorial powers into a charter beyond its plain meaning)
- Maupin v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 26, 632 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1981) (no property right in a particular job duty; property right protects continued employment generally)