Edwards v. Campbell, 338 Ga. App. 876

Background

Campbell owned Campbell Tire Company (CTC) for ~20 years and sold the business to Lanham Enterprises, LLC in 2009; as part of the asset purchase, Campbell (individually) agreed to provide 60 days of training to Lanham, who had no prior tire-business experience.
Campbell allegedly instructed that when a customer buys two tires for a four-tire vehicle, the two new tires should be placed on the front axle; Lanham believed this was an industry practice and kept CTC’s longstanding policy.
In April 2011 Edwards’s grandmother bought two tires from CTC and had them installed; Edwards was injured in a May 2011 crash while driving her car and sued alleging negligent training and breach of duty by Campbell caused unsafe installation.
Campbell moved for summary judgment arguing he owed no duty to Edwards because he sold the business and any subsequent wrongdoing flowed from Lanham/CTC; later he argued proximate cause was broken by Lanham’s independent conduct.
At the hearing Campbell raised proximate-cause as an argument (in reply brief and orally); Edwards did not file a written response on proximate cause and addressed unrelated discovery issues at the hearing.
The trial court granted summary judgment for Campbell, concluding as a matter of law any proximate cause flowed from Lanham and his employees, not Campbell; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiff was denied full and fair notice to respond when court granted summary judgment based on proximate cause	Edwards argued the proximate-cause ground was not raised in the initial motion and he lacked opportunity to respond	Campbell replied and raised proximate-cause in his reply brief and at the hearing, noting Edwards had not responded	Denied: court held Edwards had fair notice and opportunity because proximate-cause was briefed in reply and argued at hearing
Whether Campbell’s alleged negligent training in 2009 was the proximate cause of the 2011 accident	Edwards argued causal chain: negligent training → CTC installed tires improperly → accident	Campbell argued intervening acts — Lanham’s independent research and policy decisions over two years — broke the causal chain; not reasonably foreseeable that Lanham would blindly follow training for two years	Held for Campbell: as a matter of law proximate cause was broken; any proximate cause flowed from Lanham/CTC, not Campbell
Whether lapse of two years alone cannot be sole basis to break causation	Edwards contended time lapse alone cannot sever causation when two negligent acts exist	Campbell argued the time lapse coupled with Lanham’s independent actions made intervening act unforeseeable to Campbell	Held for Campbell: court did not rely solely on time lapse and affirmed that, under these facts, intervening acts and the two-year span made causation too remote
Whether triable issue exists on proximate cause requiring jury resolution	Edwards claimed proximate cause is ordinarily for jury and evidence could support causal link	Campbell asserted the evidence required a legal conclusion that proximate cause failed and no triable issue remained	Held for Campbell: proximate cause decided as matter of law because evidence allowed only one reasonable conclusion — no proximate causal link to Campbell

Key Cases Cited

Haygood v. Head, 305 Ga. App. 375 (2010) (court must ensure party against whom summary judgment is rendered has full and fair opportunity to respond)
Tidwell v. Tidwell, 251 Ga. App. 863 (2001) (summary judgment affirmed where issue was raised at hearing despite not being initial written ground)
Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Gresham, 260 Ga. 391 (1990) (proximate cause and foreseeability limit legal liability)
Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Townsend, 279 Ga. 511 (2005) (proximate cause is a policy-based limit on liability; intervening acts can break causal chain)
City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga. 834 (2002) (appellate court may affirm on any correct ground even if different from trial court’s reasoning)