Edwards v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
2016 Ark. App. 37
| Ark. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Child A.E. (b. 2012) suffered severe injuries (skull fractures, multiple bruises); DHS removed her in March 2014 and she was adjudicated dependent-neglected. Mother consented to termination; father Michael Edwards was incarcerated throughout the case.
- DHS and the attorney ad litem filed a joint petition to terminate parental rights in May 2014; an adjudication and goal of adoption/termination were entered. Edwards was served and appointed counsel but remained in prison.
- Edwards moved for a transport/continuance to attend hearings; the trial court denied continuance, noting child-focused timeliness concerns. Edwards’ counsel participated at the termination hearing; Edwards was not present.
- The court terminated Edwards’ parental rights based on (1) failure to visit/support for 12+ months and (2) an eight-year criminal sentence constituting a substantial period of the child’s life. The court found termination was in the child’s best interest to allow permanency.
- Edwards appealed, arguing termination was not in the child’s best interest, statutory grounds were not sufficiently pleaded or proven, and his due-process rights were violated by his absence and alleged defective service. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Edwards) | Defendant's Argument (DHS / Ad Litem) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether termination was in child’s best interest | Termination unnecessary: Edwards not the abuser, not unfit, had arranged for grandmother care; severance harms child’s relationship with grandmother | Child needs permanency; Edwards imprisoned entire case, no contact/support; adoption by foster parents provides stability | Affirmed: clear-and-convincing evidence supports best interest given incarceration, lack of contact, and need for permanency |
| Whether statutory grounds alleged/proved | Petition didn’t properly plead the substantial-incarceration ground and DHS/ad litem failed to prove sentence length | Ground was reasonably pled (petition referenced incarceration) and sentence evidence was before court via Edwards’ own continuance filing | Affirmed as to incarceration ground: eight-year sentence is a substantial period for a young child; ground proven |
| Whether failure to serve notice preserved reversible error | Edwards asserted lack of service in his answer but did not object at hearing; counsel participated without objecting | Service issue was waived by failure to renew objection at hearing | Held: waived; no reversible error |
| Whether Edwards’ due-process right to be present was violated | Being incarcerated prevented participation; absence at termination hearing required reversal (Wicks exception) | Edwards was represented by counsel who fully participated; federal authority shows no absolute right to be present in civil hearings if represented; issue not preserved below | Held: not preserved and not a Wicks exception; counsel’s participation protected due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (recognizing de novo review and standard for termination appeals)
- Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (articulating contemporaneous-objection rule and narrow exceptions)
- Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir.) (noting incarcerated persons lack a due-process right to be present at civil proceedings when represented)
- Brumley v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. 356 (holding length of prison sentence, not release date, controls substantial-incarceration ground)
- Cook v. Boyd, 881 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa.) (discussing representation in parental-termination hearings for incarcerated parents)
- Chaffin v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 522, 471 S.W.3d 251 (clarifying that best-interest factors are considered broadly and forward-looking)