Edward Trotter v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden
695 F. App'x 738
5th Cir.2017Background
- Trotter was convicted in 2001 of drug offenses and initially sentenced as a habitual offender to life without benefits; that conviction was vacated on federal habeas review in 2010 for a Batson violation.
- After vacatur, prosecutors offered a plea: plead guilty as a second-felony offender to one possession count (28–200g cocaine) in exchange for a 30-year sentence, credit for time served, dismissal of other charges, and no further habitual-offender enhancements.
- At the plea hearing the court advised Trotter of rights waived, the minimum/maximum sentence and fines, and admonished that as a second-felony offender he faced 15–60 years; the court accepted the guilty plea and imposed 30 years hard labor "without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence."
- After sentencing the court made speculative remarks that Trotter might be eligible for parole and noted DOC would ultimately decide parole eligibility; DOC later determined Trotter was not parole-eligible because of four felony convictions.
- Trotter sought state post-conviction relief claiming his plea was involuntary due to an unfulfilled promise of parole eligibility and that counsel was ineffective for advising him he would be eligible for parole; state courts denied relief and the federal district court denied habeas relief.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding the plea did not rest on any promise of parole and counsel’s performance was not shown to be deficient or prejudicial under Strickland.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Trotter's guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced by a promise he would be eligible for parole | Trotter: plea was induced by an unfulfilled promise or understanding that he would be parole-eligible | State: plea terms did not include parole eligibility; court fully admonished Trotter and informed him of sentencing consequences; parole is determined by DOC | Denied — plea was knowing and voluntary; no promise regarding parole was part of the plea agreement and court admonitions undermined the claim |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for advising or persuading Trotter to plead based on parole eligibility | Trotter: counsel told him he would be eligible for parole, so counsel’s advice was deficient and prejudicial | State: record does not show counsel promised parole or performed below objective standard; court admonitions contradict claim; no prejudice shown | Denied — Strickland not satisfied; no deficient performance or resulting prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prohibition on race-based juror strikes)
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (prosecutorial promises that induce a plea must be fulfilled)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (deferential AEDPA review standard for federal habeas)
