Edward Towles v. United States
115 A.3d 1222
D.C.2015Background
- MPD gun-recovery unit conducted an undercover-style stop near Bryan Place; Towles walked with a companion, made movement suggesting a gun, and then reached toward his waistband.
- Officer Katz, in close proximity, asked to pat Towles down after a sequence of suspicious movements; Towles stated it was a cell phone as he displayed a clipped device.
- Officers recovered a handgun from Towles’ pocket and later a vial of PCP; Towles was arrested and charged with multiple firearm and drug offenses.
- Judge Richter credited Officer Katz’s testimony over defense witnesses, denied the suppression motion, and Towles proceeded to a stipulated trial.
- At sentencing, the court held Towles’ Maryland involuntary-manslaughter conviction was a crime of violence, mandating a three-year minimum under DC Code § 22-4503(b)(1).
- On appeal, Towles challenged the denial of suppression and the sentencing enhancement; the court of appeals affirmed, applying de novo review to the stop/seizure question and statutory interpretation to the crime-of-violence definition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the suppression denial correct? | Towles argues the encounter amounted to an illegal seizure. | Towles contends officers lacked articulable suspicion and coerced consent. | No Fourth Amendment violation; encounter did not become an unlawful stop; consent obtained in a permissible sequence. |
| Did the officers’ questions amount to a seizure requiring suspicion? | Appellant asserts repeated questioning prolonged the detention. | Court credits Katz’s account; no unlawful prolongation beyond routine questioning. | Encounter not a seizure; sequence of events supported by credible officer testimony. |
| Was there valid consent to search or pat down? | Consent was coerced after unlawful detention. | Consent occurred before any seizure and was voluntary. | Consent valid and independent of any unlawful seizure; search incident to arrest proper after consent and detection of gun. |
| Does involuntary manslaughter count as a crime of violence under § 23-1331(4) incorporated by § 22-4503(b)(1)? | Involuntary manslaughter should not be included due to historical use of ‘voluntary’ manslaughter. | 2006 Act harmonized definitions to include involuntary manslaughter as ‘manslaughter’ within the crime-of-violence definition. | Involuntary manslaughter is a crime of violence for purposes of § 22-4503(b)(1); three-year minimum applies. |
| Was the 3-year minimum sentence properly applied given the statute interpretation? | The prior conviction did not satisfy the crime-of-violence definition. | The Council intended inclusion of involuntary manslaughter; the court properly applied the minimum. | Affirmed three-year minimum; statutory interpretation supports inclusion of involuntary manslaughter. |
Key Cases Cited
- Morris v. United States, 648 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994) (held that ‘manslaughter’ includes involuntary manslaughter for purposes of the prior-law crime-of-violence enhancement)
- Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 (D.C. 1990) (statutory interpretation of crime-of-violence definitions)
- Owens v. United States, 90 A.3d 1118 (D.C. 2014) (primary goal is ascertainment of legislative intent in statutory construction)
- In re J.F., 19 A.3d 304 (D.C. 2011) (test for seizure considering totality of circumstances)
- Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (U.S. 2007) (determinative on whether an encounter amounts to a seizure)
- Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (U.S. 1983) (consensual encounter vs. seizure analysis)
- Robinson v. United States, 76 A.3d 329 (D.C. 2013) (deference to trial-court credibility determinations in suppression rulings)
- Dobyns v. United States, 30 A.3d 155 (D.C. 2011) (statutory interpretation of crime-of-violence definitions)