Edward Thomas Kendrick, III v. State of Tennessee, 2015 Tenn. LEXIS 9

Background

Edward T. Kendrick III shot and killed his wife at a gas station in 1994; he was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and received an automatic life sentence. Key eyewitnesses placed Kendrick at the scene holding the rifle; Kendrick maintained the rifle discharged accidentally while he was moving it.
A crime-scene technician (Sergeant Miller) later found the rifle, placed it in his trunk, and the rifle discharged while he removed it, injuring his foot — a fact the defense emphasized at trial.
The State called a firearms expert (Agent Fite) who testified he could not make the rifle fire without pulling the trigger; defense counsel cross-examined Fite but did not present a firearms expert to rebut him.
Defense counsel attempted (but the trial court disallowed) to use detective reports to impeach Miller; counsel did not attempt to admit Miller’s pretrial statements as excited utterances.
On post-conviction review, Kendrick alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for (1) failing to obtain a rebuttal firearms expert and (2) failing to admit Miller’s out-of-court statements as excited utterances. The post-conviction court denied relief; the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and ordered a new trial; the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel was deficient for not retaining a firearms expert to rebut Agent Fite	Kendrick: counsel should have procured an expert (Belk or equivalent) to show the Remington trigger mechanism could misfire, which would corroborate accidental discharge and undermine premeditation	State: counsel reasonably relied on Sergeant Miller’s accidental-discharge incident and vigorous cross-examination of Fite; expert testimony was not clearly necessary or available in 1994	Held: Not deficient. Given available evidence (Miller incident, cross-examination, eyewitnesses) and uncertainties about expert availability/admissibility in 1994, counsel’s strategy was reasonable under Strickland.
Whether counsel was deficient for failing to offer Sergeant Miller’s pretrial statements as excited utterances	Kendrick: Miller’s contemporaneous statements to officers that his finger was not on the trigger were admissible and critical substantive evidence that the rifle could fire untriggered	State: trial counsel effectively used cross-examination and impeachment; the failure to invoke excited-utterance exception was an oversight but not constitutionally unreasonable	Held: Not deficient and no prejudice. Trial counsel elicited strong evidence that Miller hadn’t pulled the trigger; omission of excited-utterance admission did not undermine confidence in verdict.
Whether the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the correct legal standard in assessing prejudice	Kendrick: appellate court treated new expert and hearsay as so favorable that their omission likely altered the verdict	State: post-conviction court properly applied Strickland and the clear-and-convincing burden for factual proof	Held: Court of Criminal Appeals erred in finding deficiency/prejudice on the two issues; Tennessee Supreme Court reversed that decision and remanded remaining claims to Court of Criminal Appeals.
Whether this case required appointment/retention of expert as matter of law	Kendrick: forensic issues made expert testimony necessary to present an adequate defense	State: not every forensic issue mandates a defense expert; strategic choices to rely on cross-exam and non-expert evidence are permissible	Held: No categorical duty here. Following Harrington and Hinton, experts may be required when prosecution’s case hinges on specialized forensic proof, but on these facts counsel’s strategic choice was reasonable.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (deference to state-court Strickland determinations; counsel not per se deficient for forgoing experts where strategy and cross-examination are reasonable)
Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014) (counsel deficient where failure to seek additional funding/consultation produced an obviously inadequate expert when expert testimony was essential to the defense)
State v. Kendricks, 947 S.W.2d 875 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996) (direct appeal upholding conviction; discussed trial evidentiary rulings)
Kendricks v. State, 13 S.W.3d 401 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (post-conviction remand on ineffective-assistance claims)