Edward Stevens v. State
156 Idaho 396
| Idaho Ct. App. | 2013Background
- In 1996, an eleven-month-old boy died after a serious head injury while in Stevens' care; Stevens claimed accidental fall, the State alleged shaking and blunt force trauma.
- Stevens was tried for first-degree murder during the commission of an aggravated battery; the State presented expert testimony of shaking injuries, while Stevens offered alternative explanations.
- During direct appeal, Stevens moved for a new trial on newly discovered evidence about post-embalming eye removal; Justice Eismann was appointed to hear the motion.
- Stevens objected to the appointment; the Supreme Court denied reconsideration and the district court denied the disqualification, leading to no direct challenge on appeal.
- In 2009, Stevens filed post-conviction relief claims alleging ineffective appellate counsel, Brady violation, ineffective defense counsel, and cumulative error; the district court denied or summarily dismissed these claims, with an evidentiary hearing on several
- This appeal asks whether the district court properly denied post-conviction relief, including the Brady claim, appellate counsel claim, and various defense-counsel claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brady violation materiality | Stevens contends embalming-eye evidence was exculpatory and suppressed. | State did not possess or control the embalming report; not exculpatory evidence known to prosecutors. | No Brady violation; evidence not in state's possession and not exculpatory as presented. |
| Appellate counsel deficient for not appealing | Counsel should have challenged the Eismann assignment and the ineligible judge issue. | No deficient performance; Supreme Court appointed Eismann and rejected reconsideration, so omission was reasonable. | No deficient performance; district court did not err in denying appellate-counsel claim. |
| Embaling report discovery by defense counsel | Counsel's failure to discover the mortuary embalming report deprived Stevens of exculpatory evidence. | Counsel had no reason to seek an embalming report; not objectively unreasonable given the context. | Counsel not deficient; failure was reasonable under Strickland standards. |
| Propulsid evidence as part of defense strategy | Defense should have investigated drug interactions and Propulsid's risks to present alternative causation. | Investigation was reasonable; lack of positive medical testimony and strategic decisions supported not pursuing Propulsid. | Defense not deficient; decision to abandon Propulsid theory was reasonable. |
| Consultation about skull fracture timing | Radiologist should have been consulted to challenge the nine-centimeter fracture at trial. | Counsel pursued three experts supporting the State’s view; further radiology would not necessarily yield different outcome. | No deficient performance; investigation fell within reasonable professional norms. |
| Cumulative error | Cumulative prejudice from multiple deficient acts warrants relief. | No single or cumulative deficiency; no prejudice established. | No cumulative error; relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Supreme Court, 1984) (establishes standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (Supreme Court, 1983) (duty of appellate counsel to winnow weaker arguments)
- Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Idaho Supreme Court, 2007) (Strickland prejudice standard applies to appellate counsel)
- Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (Supreme Court, 1986) (structure for evaluating trial strategy versus deficient performance)
- Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 948 P.2d 127 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1997) (non-exhaustive investigation without deficiency; reasonable trial tactics)
- State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.3d 476 (Idaho Supreme Court, 2008) (prehearing standards for post-conviction petitions; burden of proof)
- Queen v. State, 146 Idaho 502, 198 P.3d 731 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 2008) ( Brady framework for exculpatory evidence)
- Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 106 P.3d 376 (Idaho Court of Appeals, 2004) ( Brady materiality and suppression standards)
- Kirkpatrick, 272 Ill.App.3d 67, 650 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. App. 1995) (Brady disclosure depends on prosecutor's knowledge and possession)