Edward Rezek v. City of Tustin
684 F. App'x 620
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Rezek was nearly struck by a private security vehicle driven by Jose Reyes while in a crosswalk; Rezek slapped the vehicle and confronted Reyes.
- Tustin police officers Brian Chupp and Mark Turner later arrested Rezek for vandalism of the security vehicle and for resisting arrest.
- In the ensuing criminal case, Rezek was convicted of vandalism but acquitted of resisting arrest.
- Rezek sued IPC Corporation and the private guards (IPC Defendants) and the Tustin officers (Tustin Defendants) under various tort and § 1983 theories, including malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The district court dismissed Rezek’s third amended complaint against the IPC Defendants under Twombly/Iqbal and granted summary judgment to the Tustin Defendants on malicious prosecution, finding Rezek failed to show a favorable termination of the entire criminal action because of the vandalism conviction.
- On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed: malicious prosecution claims fail for lack of favorable termination; § 1983 conspiracy fails for lack of an underlying constitutional violation; IIED barred by California’s absolute privilege for communications to law enforcement and for inadequate pleading of emotional distress.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rezek can state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim based on acquittal of resisting arrest | Rezek: acquittal on resisting arrest shows favorable termination for malicious prosecution | Defendants: conviction for vandalism prevents a favorable termination of the entire underlying action | Held: No — under California law favorable termination looks to the judgment as a whole; conviction on related charge defeats the element |
| Whether malicious prosecution elements (probable cause, malice) were met | Rezek: officers lacked probable cause and acted with malice in charging him | Defendants: probable cause existed and no favorable termination; summary judgment appropriate | Held: No need to reach probable cause/malice because failure on favorable-termination element is dispositive |
| Whether § 1983 conspiracy claim survives absent an underlying constitutional violation | Rezek: conspiracy claim based on alleged wrongful arrest/prosecution | Defendants: no underlying constitutional violation shown | Held: Dismissed — conspiracy under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation |
| Whether IIED claim against IPC Defendants is viable despite communications to police | Rezek: IIED based on defendants’ role and communications causing distress | IPC Defendants: communications to police are absolutely privileged under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b); emotional distress insufficiently pleaded | Held: Dismissed — absolute privilege bars IIED claim and pleading failed to allege adequate distress |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for motions to dismiss)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (application of Twombly pleading standard)
- StaffPro, Inc. v. Elite Show Servs., Inc., 136 Cal. App. 4th 1392 (favorable-termination requires assessing the judgment as a whole)
- Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal. 4th 666 (elements of malicious prosecution under California law)
- Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (false reporting and prosecution claims cognizable under § 1983)
- Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556 (state law governs malicious prosecution elements in § 1983 actions)
- Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205 (scope of privilege for communications to authorities)
- Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (conspiracy under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional violation)