Edward Render v. FCA US, LLC, 53 F.4th 905

Background:

Edward Render was conditionally reinstated at FCA with a one-year probation allowing termination for two unexcused tardies or one unexcused absence.
Render applied for intermittent FMLA leave for major recurrent depression and generalized anxiety; Sedgwick (FCA’s leave administrator) conditionally approved up to four intermittent FMLA days per month.
Sedgwick’s approval/notice letters gave conflicting and unclear call‑in instructions (different phone numbers and unclear direction whether to call Sedgwick, FCA, or both); FCA HR was itself uncertain about the correct procedure.
Render called in on Dec. 6–8, 2017 and Jan. 5, 2018, reporting “flare‑ups,” being “sick,” and on at least one day saying he was calling to use an FMLA day; FCA coded those absences as MISU (miscellaneous unexcused).
HR (Mitchell) learned Render claimed FMLA for the December absences but did not recode them; Render was terminated Jan. 11, 2018 for violations of his Conditional Reinstatement Letter.
The district court granted summary judgment for FCA on both FMLA interference and retaliation claims; the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding triable issues on notice, coding of absences, and pretext. The panel produced a lead opinion and a separate concurrence concerning which regulatory notice standard applies.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which FMLA notice regulation governs intermittent leave (foreseeable §825.302 vs unforeseeable §825.303)?	Intermittent leave is foreseeable because the underlying condition and "flare‑ups" were known; §825.302 applies.	FCA argued §825.303 (unforeseeable) applies and imposes stricter call‑in notice rules.	Majority: intermittent leave may be analyzed under §825.302 (foreseeable); concurrence: §825.303 applies; both agree Render met the applicable notice standard.
Did Render satisfy regulatory notice requirements to use his approved intermittent FMLA days?	He provided one‑time formal notice (application + medical certification) and his day‑of call‑ins ("flare‑ups," "sick," and at least one explicit FMLA mention) sufficiently advised FCA.	FCA said his day‑of call‑ins were vague and did not follow the stricter notice content required by the regs.	Court: Viewing facts in plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find he satisfied notice under the applicable regulation(s).
Did Render comply with FCA’s internal call‑in procedures (call both Sedgwick and FCA)?	Sedgwick’s approval letter was ambiguous/conflicting; Render reasonably called the 1‑800 FCA number and followed up with supervisors and HR, so he did what a reasonable employee would.	FCA argued Render failed to follow its “usual and customary” procedure (calling Sedgwick plus FCA), so notice was inadequate.	Court: The Sedgwick letter was ambiguous and even HR was confused; a jury could find Render reasonably complied — summary judgment improper.
Retaliation: Did FCA terminate Render for exercising FMLA rights and was its stated reason pretextual?	Render engaged in protected activity (requested FMLA), FCA knew, termination followed within months, and FCA mis‑coded absences and failed to recode them despite authority to do so — indicating pretext.	FCA relied on bona fide investigation showing calls lacked explicit ‘‘FMLA’’ wording and that unexcused absences violated the Conditional Reinstatement Letter — a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.	Court: Render established a prima facie retaliation claim; triable facts exist as to pretext (coding errors, HR’s awareness of FMLA claim but failure to recode), so summary judgment was improper.

Key Cases Cited

Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2012) (sets out elements for FMLA interference and retaliation claims)
Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2014) (discusses McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting in FMLA retaliation cases)
Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274 (6th Cir. 2012) (FMLA interference occurs regardless of employer intent)
Festerman v. County of Wayne, [citation="611 F. App'x 310"] (6th Cir. 2015) (defines intermittent leave as separate blocks for a single qualifying reason)
Evans v. Cooperative Response Center, Inc., 996 F.3d 539 (8th Cir. 2021) (employee must reference symptoms listed in certification to show day‑of notice suffices)
Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2017) (context and employer knowledge matter when assessing adequacy of call‑in notice)
Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106 (6th Cir. 2001) (the "honest belief" rule as a defense to pretext claims)
Millea v. Metro‑N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (intermittent leave for unpredictable conditions can fall under unforeseeable‑leave rules)
Acker v. General Motors, L.L.C., 853 F.3d 784 (5th Cir. 2017) (example of intermittent leave treated under unforeseeable notice rules)