Edward Peruta v. County of San Diego
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2786
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- California generally bans open and concealed public carry of handguns; concealed carry is available only via county-issued permits upon showing “good cause.”
- San Diego County policy defines “good cause” to require circumstances distinguishing the applicant from the mainstream; a mere desire for self‑defense is insufficient.
- Plaintiffs (Peruta and others), all law‑abiding citizens denied permits or deterred from applying, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the policy violates the Second Amendment.
- The district court assumed (but did not decide) the Second Amendment applies outside the home and upheld the county policy under intermediate scrutiny; plaintiffs appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit majority conducted a historical/textual inquiry, concluded the Second Amendment protects carrying operable firearms outside the home for self‑defense, and held San Diego’s “good cause” practice effectively destroys that right for ordinary citizens.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded, finding the county policy unconstitutional insofar as it prevents typical, law‑abiding citizens from carrying for self‑defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Second Amendment protects carrying operable firearms in public for self‑defense | Peruta: “bear Arms” includes carrying outside the home for confrontation; history/text support public carry for self‑defense | County: Heller treats concealed‑carry prohibitions as presumptively lawful; states may regulate carry and require good cause | Held: Yes — text and historical sources show bearing arms includes carrying a firearm outside the home for lawful self‑defense |
| Whether San Diego’s “good cause” permitting policy infringes the Second Amendment | Peruta: The policy prevents the typical law‑abiding citizen from public self‑defense carry because general self‑defense desire is not “good cause” | County: The scheme is a longstanding, presumptively lawful regulation tailored to public safety; deference to local judgment required | Held: The policy, within California’s overall scheme (open carry effectively banned), amounts to a destruction of the right and is unconstitutional |
| Proper analytic framework: historical/textual inquiry vs. interest‑balancing/intermediate scrutiny | Peruta: Must identify scope via text/history; if core right is destroyed, no balancing can save the law | County: Even if right extends outside home, intermediate scrutiny/legislative deference applies; concealed‑carry limits are longstanding | Held: Court applies Heller’s text/history first; where regulation destroys core right, heightened means‑ends balancing cannot justify it; thus no need to apply intermediate scrutiny here |
| Whether Heller’s statement that concealed‑carry prohibitions are “presumptively lawful” bars Peruta’s claim | Peruta: Heller recognized concealed‑carry bans only so long as the right to carry in some form remains; California’s overall regime bans both open and effective public carry for ordinary citizens | County: Heller’s citation endorses concealed‑carry restrictions as presumptively lawful | Held: Heller’s examples do not control where a jurisdiction (like California) both bans open carry and confines public carry to permissive licensing schemes that, as implemented, preclude ordinary self‑defense carry; Heller does not validate a total practical ban on public carry |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, core right is self‑defense, and some restrictions may be presumptively lawful)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment against the states; reiterates self‑defense core)
- Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (post‑Heller circuit analysis of standards and scrutiny)
- United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) (Ninth Circuit two‑step inquiry applying history/text then means‑ends scrutiny)
- Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (held a right to bear arms outside the home implies a right to carry loaded guns in public)
- Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (upheld New Jersey’s justifiable‑need permitting requirement as longstanding or under intermediate scrutiny)
- Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (applied intermediate scrutiny to New York permit scheme and deferred to legislative judgments)
- Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (applied intermediate scrutiny to Maryland’s “good and substantial reason” requirement and upheld it)
- United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussion of Second Amendment scope outside home and standards of review)
- Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897) (earlier Supreme Court recognition that laws prohibiting carrying concealed weapons are not inconsistent with the right to keep and bear arms)