Edward Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 17 F.4th 664

In 2008 FTS technicians sued under the FLSA; a collective action was certified and 293 technicians opted in. 2011 jury found FTS and UniTek liable and willful for unpaid overtime.
District court calculated damages using a 1.5 multiplier and entered aggregate, plaintiff-by-plaintiff judgments.
Sixth Circuit in Monroe I affirmed liability and certification but reversed two damage-calculation errors (multiplier and piece-rate hourly rate) and remanded for recalculation.
After Tyson Foods, the Supreme Court vacated and the Sixth Circuit (Monroe II) reaffirmed its view and issued a limited remand to recalculate damages using a 0.5 multiplier and corrected hourly rates.
On remand defendants sought new defenses (judicial estoppel based on bankruptcy, challenge to aggregate judgments, and insufficiency of evidence for several opt-ins). The district court declined to entertain most new arguments but denied judgment for one opt-in, Valon Harlan, for lack of sufficient evidence.
District court awarded substantial attorney’s fees (including appellate fees). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court except it reversed the denial as to Harlan and instructed entry of judgment for him; it also affirmed the fee award.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of remand (general vs limited)	Remand was limited to recalculating damages per Monroe II; district court was bound by that mandate	Remand was general; district court could consider additional defenses and relitigate issues	Remand was limited to recalculation only; district court correctly refused to expand proceedings
Judicial estoppel (bankruptcy nondisclosure)	Not within scope of limited remand; barred on remand	Judicial estoppel may bar recovery for some opt-ins and should be considered	Judicial estoppel claim was barred on remand under the mandate rule
Sufficiency of evidence for opt-in Valon Harlan	Prior appellate rulings affirmed use of estimated averages and sufficiency; remand did not permit reassessment	Evidence was insufficient for Harlan (no time records); district court should deny judgment	District court erred to reassess Harlan on remand; Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered judgment for Harlan
Appellate attorney’s fees: waiver and prevailing-party status	District court is proper forum for fee petition; plaintiffs were prevailing parties on liability and entitled to appellate fees	Plaintiffs waived appellate-fee claim or were not prevailing parties on appeal so fees are improper or should be reduced	District court did not abuse discretion: no waiver; plaintiffs were prevailing parties on appeal; appellate fees affirmed

Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 860 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2017) (Monroe II) (reaffirmed liability and issued limited remand to recalculate damages using correct hours and 0.5 multiplier)
Monroe v. FTS USA, LLC, 815 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2016) (Monroe I) (earlier appeal affirming certification and liability but identifying damage-calculation errors)
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (2016) (Supreme Court approval of representative/average evidence in certain FLSA contexts)
United States v. Moore, 131 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1997) (Moore II) (distinguishes general vs limited remands and limits district court authority on limited remand)
United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 1999) (mandate rule: district court may not expand inquiry beyond appellate remand)
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, [citation="678 F. App'x 355"] (6th Cir. 2017) (limited remand did not permit consideration of judicial estoppel defense)
Smith v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 728 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1984) (district court is preferred forum to award appellate attorney’s fees)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983) (standard for determining reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing parties)