Edward George McGregor v. State
394 S.W.3d 90
| Tex. App. | 2012Background
- McGregor was convicted of capital murder in a cold-case Wildman murder; life imprisonment imposed because death penalty not sought.
- Evidence at trial included extraneous Barnum murder (1994 Harris County) admitted under Rule 404(b) to prove identity/consent, with limiting instructions.
- DNA evidence linked McGregor to Wildman’s vaginal swab and to a condom from Barnum’s sheets, underpinning identity and connection to the crimes.
- Pre-indictment delay in Wildman case spanned roughly three years; defendant challenged speedy-trial right and sought dismissal.
- Defense sought third-party culpability instructions; trial court refused; jurors received limiting instructions about extraneous-offense evidence.
- Trial court admitted terroristic-threat testimony by Paxton/Osani tying to Barnum and Wildman; the State argued as admissions and to prove identity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barnum murder evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b). | McGregor contends Barnum is improper propensity evidence; probative value minimal. | McGregor argues Barnum evidence is highly probative of identity with similar modus operandi. | Yes; Barnum admissible to prove identity with sufficient similarity. |
| Whether Barnum evidence violated Rule 403 by prejudice. | Barnum evidence highly prejudicial; probative value outweighed by prejudice. | Proper limiting instructions mitigate prejudice; probative value substantial. | No; trial court did not abuse 403 balancing; admissible with limiting instructions. |
| Whether terroristic-threat evidence to Paxton was admissible under Rule 404(b). | Threat evidence supports show McGregor’s intent/plan; relevant to guilt. | Threats unclear who was threatened; risk of misapplication. | Admissible as non-hearsay admission and to show intent; probative value outweighed prejudice. |
| Whether the speedy-trial denial was improper under Barker v. Wingo analysis. | Delay prejudiced; preindictment delay violated right to speedy trial. | Delay attributable to inter-jurisdictional prosecutions; not constitutionally prejudicial. | No; the indictment-delay denial did not constitute actual violation under Barker framework. |
| Whether the trial court erred in denying third-party culpability instructions. | Instructions needed to address possibility of another responsible party. | Non-statutory third-party culpability defense is not a standalone instruction; alibi-like. | Yes; denial proper; not an appropriate non-statutory instruction under Giesberg framework. |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (Four-factor speedy-trial balancing framework)
- Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (speedy-trial analysis; burden shifting; four Barker factors)
- Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (Barker factor weighting; presumption against State)
- Page v. State, 137 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (identity evidence and admissibility under Rule 404(b))
- Jabari v. State, 273 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Rule 404(b) admissibility; balancing; limiting instructions)
- Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (DNA as identity signature across offenses; similarities outweighs dissimilarities)
- Giesberg v. State, 984 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (alibi defense and non-statutory instructions; weight vs. admissibility)
- Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (avoidance of impermissible comment on weight of evidence)
- Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Rule 403 balancing framework application)
- Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Rule 403 balancing and evidentiary prejudice)