Edward Flynn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 27A02-1605-CR-1027

In 2011 Flynn pleaded guilty to two Class C felony robberies and received an aggregate 10-year sentence: 4 years executed and 6 years suspended to probation (FB-8).
While on probation Flynn committed additional offenses in 2015 and 2016, including misdemeanor domestic battery (CM-113) and felony-level domestic offenses (F6-4); he also made numerous jail calls to the victim after a no-contact order.
The State filed a petition to revoke Flynn’s probation under FB-8 based on the new offenses. Flynn pled guilty to three counts of invasion of privacy (Class A misdemeanors) in F6-4 and admitted the probation violation.
At the revocation/sentencing hearing Flynn presented mitigating evidence (family hardship, difficult childhood, mental health issues); the court imposed one-year suspended sentences on the misdemeanors, consecutive to FB-8.
For the probation violation the trial court ordered Flynn to serve 2 years and 333 days of the previously suspended six-year FB-8 sentence in the DOC (less than half of the remaining suspended term).
Flynn appealed, claiming the court abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering his mitigating circumstances when executing part of the suspended sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering execution of 2 years and 333 days of Flynn’s suspended sentence after probation revocation	State: revocation sanction was within court’s discretion and statutory authority	Flynn: court failed to adequately consider mitigating factors and thus abused discretion	No abuse of discretion; court acted within its authority and need not apply Anglemyer when reinstating suspended time

Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (probation is discretionary, not a right)
Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184 (Ind. 2007) (trial court has leeway when probation conditions are violated)
Brandenburg v. State, 992 N.E.2d 951 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (review of revocation sanctions is for abuse of discretion)
Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (trial courts need not balance aggravating and mitigating factors when executing suspended sentences)
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007) (procedural rules for initial sentencing; not controlling on probation revocation)
Berry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (Anglemyer applies to initial sentences, not revocations)
Stephens v. State, 818 N.E.2d 936 (Ind. 2004) (a defendant cannot collaterally attack a sentence on appeal from a probation revocation)