Edward Eugene Barber v. Thomas J. Krepp
680 F. App'x 819
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Edward Barber, a prisoner, sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and filed a mandamus-style complaint seeking protection from retaliation after reporting fraud to federal prosecutors.
- Barber received a June 2014 DOJ letter assigning a victim ID and instructing him to report threats related to cooperation with the government. He alleges prison officials (including officials across Georgia corrections entities) retaliated for his reports.
- Barber alleged severe past attacks (stabbings, near loss of an eye) and threats of forced unnecessary antipsychotic medication and planting a weapon to justify his death. He named specific alleged perpetrators in filings.
- The district court denied IFP and dismissed Barber’s complaint under § 1915(g) (three-strikes rule), finding his allegations insufficiently specific to show imminent danger.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the PLRA legal interpretation and reviewed the IFP denial for abuse of discretion. It concluded Barber’s filings (construed liberally as pro se) alleged ongoing and recent threats and violence sufficient to meet the § 1915(g) imminent-danger exception.
- The court vacated and reversed the dismissal, remanding with instructions to grant IFP and proceed; it left merits screening and other potential defenses for the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barber, a three‑strike prisoner under § 1915(g), falls within the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception | Barber alleged recent, severe attacks and ongoing threats and named alleged perpetrators; transfer doesn’t eliminate risk due to alleged statewide conspiracy | Government argued allegations were not specific, primarily recounted past harm, and transfer mooted risk; also argued venue/jurisdiction issues tied to CVRA | Barber met the imminent‑danger exception; IFP denial was an abuse of discretion and dismissal vacated and reversed |
| Whether the district court’s factual/legal standard for § 1915(g) was proper | Construing pro se filings liberally, Barber urged courts to consider timely filings beyond labeled complaints | District court required more specific identification of threats and actors to show imminent danger | Eleventh Circuit: district court misapplied standard by failing to credit recent allegations and pro se liberality; abused discretion |
| Whether Barber’s transfer renders claims moot or removes imminent danger | Barber asserted conspiracy beyond one prison, so transfer may not stop retaliation | Government contended transfer mooted risk and thus IFP exception inapplicable | Transfer does not necessarily moot imminent-danger claim; remand to reassess if transfer later eliminates risk |
| Whether a nexus between alleged risk and claims is required for § 1915(g) exception | Barber argued his danger arises from defendant’s inaction in protecting him in connection with his CVRA‑related complaints | Amicus (U.S.) urged adopting Second Circuit’s nexus requirement (Pettus) | Court declined to decide broadly but found a sufficient nexus here between alleged harm and defendants’ failure to protect |
Key Cases Cited
- Daker v. Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2016) (standards for reviewing IFP denials and PLRA interpretation)
- Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (pro se complaints must be liberally construed for § 1915(g) analysis)
- Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 828 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2016) (abuse of discretion standard explained)
- Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (recent injuries and threats can establish ongoing pattern and imminent danger)
- Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2009) (Second Circuit’s view that § 1915(g) imminent‑danger exception requires nexus)
- Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) (§ 1915(g) is a threshold fee question distinct from merits screening)
- Asemani v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 797 F.3d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (timely filings beyond labeled complaints may be considered for imminent‑danger showing)
- Santiago‑Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015) (caution on treating statutory venue provisions as jurisdictional)