348 So.3d 456
Fla.2022Background
- In 2014 Covington pleaded guilty to murdering his girlfriend and her two children, mutilating their bodies, and killing the family dog; he confessed, waived a penalty-phase jury, and received three death sentences. The convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal in Covington v. State, 228 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017).
- At sentencing the court found multiple aggravators (including HAC, prior violent felony, victim under 12, and custodial authority) and credited statutory and nonstatutory mitigation for bipolar disorder, intermittent explosive disorder, and substance abuse (some mitigators given moderate or great weight).
- Covington filed a Rule 3.851 postconviction motion in 2019 raising (among other claims) that evolving standards of decency bar execution of the mentally ill and numerous ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC) claims about penalty-phase strategy and mitigation development (insanity testimony, PET/qEEG neuroimaging, confession redactions, ASPD/psychopathy rebuttal, substance-abuse mitigation, missing witnesses).
- After multi-day evidentiary hearings (Dec 2019 and Sept 2020), the trial court denied relief, finding counsel made reasonable, strategic choices (e.g., not eliciting an insanity opinion to avoid State rebuttal; reasonable decision not to pursue PET given weight, medication, and transport issues; admitting unredacted confession to support mitigation) and that Covington failed to show prejudice under Strickland.
- Covington also filed a habeas petition asking the Court to reperform a proportionality review and to bar execution based on severe mental illness; the Supreme Court of Florida held many claims procedurally barred and denied habeas relief.
- The Florida Supreme Court affirmed denial of postconviction relief and denied the habeas petition, applying Strickland, Frye/admissibility principles, and Florida procedural-bar precedent, and declined to recede from Lawrence v. State regarding comparative proportionality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evolving standards of decency bar execution of the mentally ill | Covington: his severe mental illness (insanity) exempts him from the death penalty under evolving standards/Eighth Amendment | State: no categorical bar; claim was previously rejected and procedurally defaulted | Denied: claim procedurally barred and meritless; Florida has no categorical insanity bar to execution |
| IAC — failure to present insanity opinion at penalty phase | Covington: counsel should have elicited Dr. McClain’s opinion that he was insane at the time of the murders | State: counsel strategically avoided an explicit insanity opinion to prevent State expert rebuttal; underlying facts were already presented | Denied: counsel's choice reasonable and not prejudicial under Strickland |
| IAC — failure to obtain PET scan / admission of qEEG evidence | Covington: PET/qEEG would have shown brain impairment and been highly mitigating; counsel erred in not renewing qEEG motion after waiving jury | State: experts advised PET unlikely to help; weight, medication weaning, and transport/security made PET impracticable; qEEG did not meet Frye | Denied: counsel reasonably declined PET; qEEG inadmissible; no Strickland prejudice |
| IAC — failure to redact interrogation / waiver of pretrial objections | Covington: counsel should have redacted or preserved objections to prejudicial collateral-acts in interrogation video | State: counsel reasonably chose completeness and to use disturbing facts to support mitigation theme | Denied: strategic admission of unredacted tape was reasonable and not prejudicial |
| IAC — rebuttal of ASPD/psychopathy diagnosis | Covington: counsel failed to adequately object to State experts diagnosing ASPD/psychopathy | State: defense experts rebutted ASPD at trial; counsel prepared experts to counter State testimony | Denied: counsel was not deficient; sentencing court still credited bipolar/substance mitigators |
| Habeas — request for new proportionality review under Eighth Amendment | Covington: Court should re-conduct proportionality (and recognize insanity mitigation) | State: proportionality claim was raised previously and is procedurally barred; Eighth Amendment does not require comparative proportionality | Denied: procedurally barred and not required by federal Eighth Amendment; Court declines to recede from Lawrence |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
- Covington v. State, 228 So. 3d 49 (Fla. 2017) (direct-appeal opinion affirming convictions and death sentences)
- Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (Florida conformity clause bars comparative proportionality review)
- Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (Eighth Amendment does not require comparative proportionality review)
- Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (Frye standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence)
- Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93 (Fla. 2013) (postconviction experts reaching more favorable conclusions does not alone show counsel deficient)
- Jennings v. State, 123 So. 3d 1101 (Fla. 2013) (courts may defer to trial counsel’s reliance on qualified experts)
- Wheeler v. State, 124 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 2013) (presentation of cumulative evidence not ineffective assistance)
- Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 2007) (cumulative/cumulative-mitigation principles in IAC review)
- Dailey v. State, 283 So. 3d 782 (Fla. 2019) (procedural bar for claims that could have been raised on direct appeal)
- Smith v. State, 126 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 2013) (habeas is not the vehicle to relitigate claims from postconviction motions)
- Hayward v. State, 183 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2015) (standard for assessing prejudice in penalty-phase IAC claims)